Philosopher Bryan Frances Challenges Thesis on Disagreement and Belief Suspension
Philosopher Bryan Frances is challenging a central thesis (BT) proposed by László Bernáth and János Tőzsér, which posits that philosophers should suspend belief in any proposition subject to robust, long-standing, and well-tested disagreement. Frances, in his essay 'Belief While Disagreeing: Our Mistakes and Their Frequency,' argues that while he is sympathetic to BT, it likely has numerous exceptions and that truly 'robust' disagreement is rarer than commonly perceived. He clarifies BT by emphasizing the necessity of awareness of disagreement for belief suspension and suggests that the thesis applies even if a belief is otherwise strongly supported. Frances also questions the permanence of philosophical disagreement, noting that many claims subject to robust disagreement in one period were not in others, and that the extent of disagreement can change over time due to factors like the number of philosophers or advancements like AI. He further delves into the complexities of defining 'robust disagreement,' ... 
