U.S. Army's 'How the Army Fights' Document Lacks Clear Theory of Victory for Modern Conflicts
The U.S. Army's recently released document, 'How the Army Fights' (HTAF), intended to guide the Army's preparation for war, is facing criticism for lacking a clear theory of victory grounded in the current strategic context. The document, published in October 2026, draws inspiration from the AirLand Battle concept but fails to align with the 2025 National Security Strategy's focus on deterrence by denial in the Pacific's first island chain. Critics, including Huba Wass de Czege, lead author of AirLand Battle, argue that HTAF, like its predecessor 'multidomain operations' (MDO), does not clearly define the military problem or articulate a coherent theory of victory against specific adversaries like China. The document's reliance on a 'central idea' with four operational elements—convergence, strike, close battle, and endurance—is seen as vague and potentially contradictory, offering ambiguous guidance for how the Army should fight in diverse scenarios.
