ISP-Dependent Access
Your internet journey in India is significantly shaped by your Internet Service Provider (ISP), extending beyond mere price and service quality to encompass
the very breadth of online content you can access. This variation arises because ISPs are mandated to block websites based on directives from governmental and judicial bodies. However, the crucial point is that these blocking mandates are not applied uniformly; the specific lists of websites each ISP blocks can differ substantially. Consequently, two users with different ISPs might experience entirely different levels of internet freedom, even within the same geographical location. This personalized censorship landscape is a direct result of how each ISP interprets and implements the broad blocking powers granted under Indian law, creating a patchwork of accessibility that defines the user experience.
Legal Framework for Blocks
The authority for governments to instruct ISPs and other online intermediaries to block access to specific internet content is enshrined in Sections 69A and 79 of India's Information Technology Act, 2000. These legal provisions grant significant power to control online information flow. Furthermore, the licensing agreements that ISPs operate under explicitly obligate them to "block Internet sites [...] as identified and directed by the Licensor from time to time." This means blocking is a contractual requirement for service providers. The precise blocking orders are generally kept confidential between the government and the ISP, although in cases involving copyright or trademark disputes, these orders may become public as part of official court documents. Often, the public becomes aware of these blocks only when users encounter inaccessible sites and start questioning why, much like the recent situation with Supabase. In some high-profile instances, like the 2020 ban on 59 Chinese applications including TikTok, the government has proactively announced its blocking actions.
Technical Blocking Methods
The internet functions through a complex set of protocols, including HTTP, TLS, and the Domain Name System (DNS). When an ISP receives an order to block a website, it has the flexibility to employ any or all of these protocols for implementation. DNS is typically the first point of interaction for a user trying to reach a website; it translates human-readable domain names into numerical IP addresses that computers understand. To block a domain at the DNS level, an ISP can manipulate its DNS servers to provide incorrect information, a technique known as DNS poisoning. Instead of directing the user to the legitimate website's address, the ISP's servers point the request to an alternate, often non-existent, address. While it's also possible for ISPs to intercept unencrypted HTTP traffic and display a "block page," this method is largely obsolete due to the widespread use of HTTPS. For encrypted HTTPS connections, ISPs commonly inspect the Server Name Indication (SNI) field to identify and terminate connections to prohibited domains before they are fully established. In practice, most Indian ISPs predominantly use DNS blocking due to its cost-effectiveness and simplicity, avoiding the need for more complex deep packet inspection.
Data Reveals Inconsistency
To gauge the scope of website blocking across India, a comprehensive study examined the DNS servers of six major and regional ISPs. This research tested the censorship status of 294 million domains, representing almost the entirety of the visible internet domain space, over several months in 2025. The findings, which constitute the most extensive study of DNS-level website blocking in India to date, quantitatively support previous qualitative observations about internet censorship. The data clearly indicates that despite receiving identical blocking directives, ISPs do not uniformly block the same websites. Out of a total of 43,083 blocked domain names identified, a mere 1,414 were blocked by all six participating ISPs. It's important to note that this analysis focused on DNS-level blocking, and some ISPs might be using other methods for blocking, which were not covered. Nevertheless, the results highlight a significant inconsistency in how domains are treated, particularly based on their content category. Websites related to piracy, peer-to-peer file sharing, pornography, and gambling constitute the bulk of blocked content, yet enforcement varies widely. However, for domains hosting content associated with terrorism and militancy, blocking consistency across ISPs increases dramatically. In certain highly sensitive cases, such as the blocking of China's Weibo.com or The Kashmir Walla publication, there was complete consensus among ISPs, suggesting that some orders are prioritized more than others. Furthermore, nearly all ISPs appear to engage in some form of arbitrary blocking, adding another layer of unpredictability.
A Patchwork Digital Landscape
The extensive data collected paints a picture of a haphazard implementation of blocking orders by both national and regional ISPs in India. This inconsistency stems from the absence of a standardized framework or clear guidelines, leaving ISPs to operate with considerable autonomy. The result is a fragmented internet landscape where a website blocked by one provider might be perfectly accessible through another. This situation undermines the intended purpose of censorship and unfairly impacts users whose ISPs are more aggressive in their blocking practices. Moreover, the problem is compounded by the fact that domains that have been officially ordered to be unblocked frequently remain inaccessible through certain ISPs, seemingly in defiance of these directives, yet without any apparent penalty for the ISPs or relief for the website operators. This ongoing situation highlights significant flaws in the current system's enforcement and oversight.
Opaqueness and Due Process
Beyond inconsistency, a significant drawback of India's internet censorship regime is its pervasive lack of transparency. Ideally, a system of blocked domains would be publicly disclosed, with limited exceptions made only for highly sensitive matters like national security or the prevention of child sexual abuse material. The current opaqueness makes it difficult to distinguish between legitimate blocking actions and overreach, especially when the study identified numerous malicious domains that were blocked – an action arguably in the public interest, but indistinguishable from broader censorship without disclosure. While the Supreme Court, in its landmark _Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India_ (2015) judgment, upheld Section 69A, it also emphasized the necessity of procedural safeguards, including the establishment of review committees and the right for affected parties to be heard. In practice, these crucial safeguards cannot function effectively when the entire system operates as a disconnected, unreliable patchwork, hindering due process and accountability.
