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North Korea has more money at its disposal than at any point during Kim Jong Un’s 15 years in power, despite years of United Nations sanctions aimed at choking
the regime’s access to foreign currency. A Bloomberg Economics analysis of government trade figures, intelligence and outside research estimates that Kim’s family-run dictatorship generated as much as $22 billion in foreign revenue between 2022 and 2025. That figure is nearly four times the amount estimated for the previous four-year period. The development has left North Korea in a markedly different position from the country that emerged from the economic shocks of the Covid-19 pandemic, with Kim now benefiting from Russia’s war in Ukraine, cyber theft and a renewed relationship with major powers that once sought to isolate his regime.
Russia War Turns Into Kim’s Financial Lifeline
The biggest change came in 2022, when Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine and Moscow suddenly needed large quantities of ammunition. North Korea, with vast stockpiles of Soviet-era artillery shells, found itself with something Russia urgently needed.
The resulting military relationship has become one of Kim’s most valuable sources of revenue. By the end of 2025, North Korea had supplied as much as 50 per cent of Russia’s requirements for frequently used 122 mm and 152 mm artillery ammunition, according to Ukrainian intelligence estimates cited in the source material.
Pyongyang went beyond supplying shells. North Korea also deployed an estimated 16,000 to 22,000 troops to support Russia’s war effort, with South Korean estimates and the Center for Strategic and International Studies putting their monthly compensation at around $2,000 per soldier.
“North Korea-Russia military cooperation is no longer merely a diplomatic or security issue,” South Korean opposition lawmaker Kang Daesik said, describing it as a key source of income supporting the North Korean economy.
Sanctions Failed To Stop Kim’s Cash Flow
North Korea’s financial recovery is particularly striking because the regime was supposed to be constrained by the international sanctions system. The UN Security Council’s 1718 sanctions regime was designed to restrict the resources available to Pyongyang for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
Yet Kim has increasingly moved away from the small-scale sanctions evasion that once characterised the regime’s illicit economy. The source material points to a much broader system involving arms transfers, cyber theft, covert trade and payments made through goods and technology rather than conventional banking channels.
Crypto Theft Gives North Korea Another Revenue Stream
Russia is not the only reason for Kim’s improved financial position. Over the past decade, North Korea has developed an extensive cyber-theft operation targeting cryptocurrency exchanges, companies and digital wallets around the world.
According to blockchain intelligence firm TRM Labs, hacking groups linked to Pyongyang now account for more than 70 per cent of global cryptocurrency thefts, compared with roughly 30 per cent in 2017. The stolen funds are then laundered through networks that can include organised criminal groups operating from China.
Nick Carlsen, a senior investigator with TRM Labs, said the scale of North Korea’s access to stolen cryptocurrency was difficult to comprehend. The cyber operation has effectively given Kim another source of foreign currency that does not depend on traditional exports or access to international banks.
A Richer North Korea Is Building More Weapons
The money is also showing up inside North Korea. Pyongyang’s economy expanded by an estimated 3.5 per cent in 2025, according to the Bank of Korea, marking the third consecutive year of growth and following the country's strongest economic performance since sanctions were tightened.
Trade with China has also increased. The source material notes that imports of sports and leisure products reached their highest levels since sanctions, with items including water skis, video games, treadmills and other equipment entering North Korea.
But the more consequential destination for Kim’s new wealth is the military. North Korea has continued a rapid nuclear build-up while simultaneously investing in capabilities that were once difficult for the regime to develop.
The country has unveiled two 5,000-tonne destroyers, its largest warships to date. At least one appears to be fitted with a Russian Pantsir-M air-defence system, according to the source material, suggesting that military cooperation with Moscow could be giving North Korea access to technology beyond what it has historically been able to produce domestically.
A US Forces Korea official said Russian technology transfers had enabled Pyongyang to “compress its weapon development timelines”. Russia and North Korea have also been producing strike drones, while North Korean ballistic missiles used in the Ukraine war have reportedly incorporated modifications rather than simply copying Russian designs.
Kim’s Stronger Regime Means A Bigger Global Threat
That combination changes the strategic calculation surrounding North Korea. A regime with more money, stronger diplomatic relationships and access to foreign military technology has greater room to expand its nuclear and conventional capabilities without having to negotiate with Washington or Seoul from a position of immediate economic desperation.
Kim’s relationship with Russia has also helped reduce his diplomatic isolation. China, after years of unease over Pyongyang’s growing dependence on Moscow, has shown signs of renewed engagement, with Kim standing alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin at a Beijing military parade.
The nuclear programme remains at the centre of that strategy. North Korea has consistently argued that its nuclear arsenal is necessary to deter an attack, pointing to the experiences of countries such as Iraq and Libya as warnings about what happens to regimes that surrender strategic weapons.
The concern for the US, South Korea and their allies is therefore not simply that North Korea has become richer. It is that Kim has demonstrated an ability to turn sanctions pressure into a system of alternative revenue streams, while using the proceeds to strengthen the very military capabilities that the sanctions were intended to constrain.
“North Korea is in a stronger position than at any point in the last 35 years,” Korean studies specialist Andrei Lankov said, describing Russian arms sales as akin to “winning the lottery” and renewed Chinese support as a dependable “pension”.
For years, the central assumption behind international pressure on Pyongyang was that economic isolation could eventually force Kim towards denuclearisation talks. The latest evidence suggests the opposite problem may now be emerging: North Korea has learned how to survive — and potentially prosper — while remaining under sanctions.
