For decades, winter in Jammu and Kashmir, especially the brutal Chillai Kalan period, has been viewed as a natural pause button in counter-terror operations.
Heavy snowfall, closed passes and sub-zero temperatures traditionally forced security forces into a defensive posture, while terrorists used the season as cover to regroup, hide and survive. That assumption no longer holds. This winter marks a clear doctrinal shift in India’s counter-terror strategy in the Jammu region. The Indian Army’s intensified operations across Kishtwar and Doda are not merely tactical adjustments; they signal a strategic intent to deny terrorism its last remaining advantage, terrain and season. By pushing operations into higher, snowbound and previously inaccessible areas, the Army has effectively declared that winter will no longer be a refuge. Temporary bases, high-altitude surveillance posts and continuous patrols along ridgelines underline a simple message: there will be no seasonal lull, no operational pause, and no safe havens, regardless of weather. This shift is particularly significant given current intelligence assessments that place roughly 30–35 Pakistani terrorists in the Jammu region. Sustained pressure over the past months has already forced these groups out of lower altitudes and populated belts, pushing them into inhospitable middle and higher mountain reaches. Strategically, this containment is as important as elimination. Terrorists cut off from population centres lose access to logistics, intelligence, recruitment and ideological influence. What stands out this winter is the integrated nature of operations. The Army is no longer operating in silos but is leading a tightly coordinated grid involving the Jammu and Kashmir Police, CRPF, Special Operations Group, Civil Administration, Forest Guards and Village Defence Guards. This convergence of intelligence and operational execution reflects a maturing counter-terror ecosystem, one where response time is compressed and tactical surprise is maximised. Technology has emerged as a decisive force multiplier. Drones, thermal imagers, ground sensors and surveillance radars are compensating for the challenges of visibility and mobility posed by snowbound terrain. When combined with specialised winter warfare units trained in snow combat and high-altitude survival, the result is sustained operational momentum even in conditions designed to stall it. Equally important is the Army’s embrace of dynamic planning. Instead of static winter deployments, commanders are continuously adjusting patrol grids, repositioning troops and refining strategies based on real-time intelligence and weather patterns. This flexibility disrupts terrorist calculations, which traditionally relied on predictability, knowing when and where forces would scale back. There is also a crucial human dimension to this strategy. With local support networks drying up, terrorists have reportedly attempted to coerce villagers for food and shelter. The visible presence of security forces in remote areas, coupled with the active role of Village Defence Guards, has limited these attempts and reinforced public confidence. Counter-terrorism, after all, is as much about securing the population as it is about neutralising the threat. At a broader level, the Army’s “surveillance–sweep–surveillance” doctrine ensures that operations are not episodic but continuous. Each tactical gain is followed by sustained monitoring, preventing regrouping and ensuring that cleared areas do not relapse into vulnerability once the snow melts. The strategic message emanating from Kishtwar and Doda is unmistakable. Pakistan-sponsored terrorism will no longer find shelter in seasons, snow or silence. Winter is no longer a pause in the counter-terror calendar, it is now an extension of it. In redefining winter warfare against terrorism, the Indian Army is not just adapting to terrain. It is reshaping the rules of engagement themselves.
