When Russian forces crossed into Ukraine in February 2022, the conflict initially looked like a conventional 21st-century war— tanks, missiles, air strikes, and cyberattacks. But within weeks, it became
clear that something unprecedented was unfolding far above the battlefield. For the first time in modern history, a privately owned satellite constellation was playing a decisive role in sustaining a nation’s war effort.
SpaceX’s Starlink, a commercial satellite internet service launched to provide high-speed broadband, became a lifeline for Ukraine. As Russian strikes crippled terrestrial communication networks, Starlink terminals allowed Ukrainian military units, government agencies, and emergency responders to stay connected. What began as an emergency workaround soon evolved into a core element of Ukraine’s battlefield communications.
Three years on, NATO intelligence warnings that Russia may be developing capabilities to disrupt or even attack Starlink have underscored a fundamental shift. Satellites are no longer neutral infrastructure hovering above geopolitics. They are now active military enablers, and increasingly, legitimate targets. The Ukraine war has not changed how wars are fought; it has rewritten how the world thinks about satellites, space policy, and the rules governing orbit.
How Starlink Changed The War On The Ground
Before Ukraine, military communications relied primarily on government-owned satellites, hardened networks, and encrypted systems controlled by states. Commercial satellite services existed, but they were peripheral; used for logistics, back-up communications, or civilian connectivity. Ukraine changed that equation almost overnight.
Starlink terminals were small, portable, and quick to deploy. Ukrainian units could carry them close to the frontlines, enabling real-time coordination between troops, drone operators, and artillery units. Commanders could transmit intelligence, share live drone feeds, and adjust tactics on the fly. This agility gave Ukraine a critical edge against a numerically superior adversary.
Crucially, Starlink’s architecture made it harder to disrupt. Unlike traditional satellites that operate in small numbers, Starlink relies on thousands of low-Earth orbit satellites. Disabling the network would require large-scale, sustained attacks, something Russia struggled to achieve without escalating into overt space warfare.
For military planners worldwide, this was a revelation. A commercial, civilian system had proven more resilient and adaptable than many state-run military networks. The implication was unsettling and transformative at the same time: future wars could hinge on technologies not owned or controlled by governments.
The Blurring Line Between Civilian And Military Space
Starlink’s success in Ukraine exposed a legal and ethical grey zone that existing space laws were never designed to handle. International space treaties, including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, were drafted during the Cold War. They assumed that states, not private companies, would be the primary actors in space, and that satellites would largely serve peaceful purposes.
Ukraine shattered those assumptions. Starlink is a civilian service, but its use by Ukrainian forces turned it into a dual-use asset, serving both military and non-military functions simultaneously. Hospitals, journalists, and civilians relied on the same network that enabled battlefield operations.
This dual-use nature complicates the question of legitimacy. If a satellite supports military action, does it become a lawful target under the laws of war? If it also serves civilians, does attacking it constitute a violation of international humanitarian principles?
Russia’s reported interest in targeting Starlink suggests that adversaries are increasingly willing to answer these questions pragmatically rather than legally. In modern conflict, utility, not ownership, appears to determine whether an asset is considered fair game.
Why Commercial Satellites Have Become Wartime Targets
For decades, satellites were viewed as strategic assets but rarely attacked. Disabling them risked escalation and global fallout, including damage to civilian infrastructure far beyond the battlefield. Ukraine has altered that calculus.
Military analysts now openly discuss satellite jamming, cyber interference, and even kinetic anti-satellite weapons as viable tools of war. Commercial constellations, once considered off-limits, are increasingly seen as extensions of a nation’s military capability.
This shift is driven by necessity as much as strategy. Modern warfare relies heavily on data such as navigation, targeting, surveillance, and communication. Satellites underpin all of these functions. If an adversary depends on a commercial network, disrupting it can yield outsized advantages without engaging troops directly.
At the same time, the proliferation of satellites makes space more crowded and contested. With thousands of satellites in low-Earth orbit, distinguishing between civilian and military assets becomes harder, increasing the risk of miscalculation.
Why Is There A Policy Vacuum?
Despite these changes, global space governance remains stuck in the past. Existing treaties prohibit weapons of mass destruction in space but say little about cyberattacks, jamming, or interference with satellites. They also do not clearly address the role of private companies in armed conflict.
Starlink’s involvement in Ukraine has exposed this policy vacuum. Decisions about enabling or restricting access to the network were sometimes made by corporate executives rather than elected governments. In one widely reported episode, SpaceX limited Starlink’s use in certain areas, raising questions about accountability and control.
This raises a profound dilemma for policymakers. When private companies provide critical infrastructure in wartime, who sets the rules? Governments may fund or encourage such services, but they do not always own or operate them. The result is a fragmented decision-making landscape where corporate interests, national security, and international law collide.
How Major Powers Are Rethinking Space Strategy
The United States has been the first to openly adapt to this new reality. The Pentagon now views commercial satellites as integral to military resilience, investing in partnerships with private firms and developing strategies to protect dual-use assets. At the same time, it is preparing for scenarios where adversaries target these networks.
Russia and China are moving in parallel, though with different emphases. Both have invested heavily in counter-space capabilities, including jamming, cyber tools, and anti-satellite weapons. Ukraine has reinforced its belief that disabling space-based infrastructure can yield strategic dividends without crossing traditional red lines.
China, in particular, is closely studying the Starlink model. It has accelerated plans for its own large satellite constellations while also developing systems to track and potentially neutralise adversary satellites. For Beijing, control of orbit is becoming as important as dominance at sea or in the air.
What This Means For India’s Space Future
For India, the implications of this shift are immediate and consequential. India is rapidly expanding its space footprint, with ambitions ranging from satellite-based broadband and Earth observation to defence applications and human spaceflight. Private players are increasingly entering the sector, supported by policy reforms aimed at boosting innovation.
In June 2020, India started introducing reforms in the space sector. It released the India Space Policy 2023 and the Space Vision 2047 roadmap to democratise space activities.
At the same time, India faces a complex security environment. Tensions with China, the need for secure communications across vast borders, and growing reliance on satellite-enabled services make space a critical domain for national security.
The Ukraine-Starlink precedent raises questions for New Delhi. If India relies on commercial satellites for communication, navigation, or surveillance, how vulnerable are these systems in a conflict? What safeguards exist to protect them from interference? And how much control should the government exert over private providers during crises?
Group Captain Ajey Lele (retired), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA (Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses), said it is “difficult” to regulate private satellite providers. “India may be follow a case-by-case approach.” He further said space assets are “much vulnerable, mainly, from jamming”.
India’s existing space doctrine has focused largely on state-run assets. The growing role of private companies requires a rethink. Regulatory frameworks will need to address dual-use technologies, data sovereignty, and the responsibilities of private firms in national emergencies.
The Risk Of Escalation Beyond Earth
Perhaps the most troubling legacy of Ukraine’s satellite war is the risk of escalation in space itself. Unlike conventional battlefields, orbit is a shared environment. Damage to one satellite can create debris that threatens others, potentially triggering cascading failures known as the Kessler Syndrome.
An attack intended to disrupt a military network could inadvertently cripple global communication, navigation, and weather forecasting systems. The consequences would not be confined to warring states but would be felt worldwide.
This makes the absence of clear norms and rules particularly dangerous. As more actors view space as a legitimate arena for conflict, the risk of miscalculation grows. Ukraine has shown how valuable satellites can be; it has also highlighted how fragile the orbital ecosystem is.
Where Does The Future Lie?
The Ukraine war marks a turning point in the history of warfare and space governance. Satellites have moved from the background to the foreground, from passive tools to active enablers, and targets of conflict. Commercial companies now sit at the intersection of geopolitics and security, wielding influence once reserved for states.
For India and the world, the lesson is clear. Space can no longer be treated as a benign or separate domain. Policy, law, and defence planning must catch up with technological reality. As orbit becomes more crowded and contested, the choices made today will shape not just the future of warfare, but the stability of the global commons above our heads.
Lele stresses that a “global treaty mechanism under the UN umbrella” is needed as a safeguard as space becomes the next contested domain.
