Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meeting with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Delhi on Saturday came at a moment when a maritime chokepoint thousands of kilometres from India is emerging as a major
security and economic concern for New Delhi.
The two leaders met on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit at Hyderabad House, with India and Ethiopia already deepening cooperation in areas, including defence. Earlier this month, officials from the two countries discussed military training, defence-industry collaboration and UN peacekeeping, including cooperation in new and emerging areas. India and Ethiopia had also elevated their relationship to a Strategic Partnership in December 2025.
This is why the timing of the BRICS Summit matters.
Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis have rapidly advanced along the Red Sea coast, capturing the strategic port of Mocha and key islands, including Perim, raising fears that they could threaten traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important shipping chokepoints.
So why does Ethiopia matter to India in a crisis centred in Yemen?
First, What’s Happening At Bab el-Mandeb?
Bab el-Mandeb is the narrow maritime gateway connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and, through the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean. For ships travelling between Asia and Europe, it is one of the most important shortcuts in the world.
That makes the developments in Yemen much bigger than another chapter in the country’s long-running civil war.
The Houthis’ latest advance has put them in a position to threaten the maritime approaches to the strait. Reuters reported that the group has seized Perim Island, which sits inside the Bab el-Mandeb, while other reports say Houthi forces have also taken control of strategic locations along the Red Sea coast.
The concern is not necessarily that every ship will suddenly be physically stopped. The bigger danger is that shipping companies may decide the route is simply too risky.
That is what happened after Houthi attacks on commercial shipping began in late 2023. Red Sea shipping fell sharply as vessels were diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding thousands of kilometres to journeys between Asia and Europe.
Why Should India Care About A Chokepoint Near Africa?
Because India’s trade and energy flows are deeply connected to it.
A ship travelling from India towards Europe normally has the option of moving through the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab el-Mandeb, Red Sea and Suez Canal. If that route becomes unsafe, ships have to take the much longer route around Africa. That means higher fuel consumption, higher insurance costs, longer delivery times and more expensive freight.
Eventually, those costs can reach ordinary consumers through everything from fuel and imported goods to industrial inputs.
The energy angle is even more serious.
The Bab el-Mandeb crisis is unfolding at the same time as the Strait of Hormuz is under pressure. Saudi Arabia has also temporarily shut its East-West oil pipeline after an attack, further complicating the region’s energy picture.
For India, two critical maritime gateways around West Asia being disrupted simultaneously would be a major strategic vulnerability.
So, Why Ethiopia?
This is where the geography can be misleading.
Ethiopia does not control the Bab el-Mandeb. It is landlocked and cannot send a navy into the strait. So, the claim that Ethiopia can simply use its influence to make the Houthis back off should be treated with caution.
The more important point is that Ethiopia sits at the centre of the Horn of Africa, on the African side of the wider Red Sea security theatre. And India has been steadily increasing its engagement with this region.
That makes Ethiopia potentially important not as a country that can control the crisis, but as part of a network through which India can understand, manage and respond to it.
India’s ‘Horn Of Africa’ Strategy Has Changed
For years, India’s engagement with the Horn of Africa was largely seen through the lens of anti-piracy operations, peacekeeping and commercial links.
Now, India’s interests stretch across maritime security, trade, defence cooperation, connectivity, development partnerships and diplomatic engagement with countries around the Red Sea and western Indian Ocean.
An analysis in The Conversation argues that India’s approach to the Horn has shifted towards a more comprehensive strategy, combining security engagement with economic and diplomatic partnerships.
The timing of the PM Modi-Abiy meeting is therefore significant.
India is effectively trying to build relationships around the maritime theatre, rather than looking only at the waterway itself.
Ethiopia has something India increasingly needs: a strong partner in the Horn. Ethiopia is one of Africa’s most important political and diplomatic centres. It hosts the African Union and has considerable influence in continental diplomacy. It is also directly dependent on the Red Sea trade ecosystem.
Being landlocked, Ethiopia relies heavily on the Djibouti corridor for its access to international shipping. That means disruption in the Red Sea is not an abstract foreign-policy problem for Addis Ababa. It is an economic-security problem.
In other words, India and Ethiopia have a common interest in keeping the Red Sea region stable and trade routes functioning, even though their immediate vulnerabilities are different.
For India, the concern is its trade and energy lifelines. For Ethiopia, it is access to the sea and the functioning of the corridor on which much of its foreign trade depends.
The Defence Angle
This is where the details of Saturday’s PM Modi-Abiy meeting should not be overlooked.
The bilateral meeting came just days after Indian and Ethiopian officials discussed expanding defence cooperation, including military training, defence-industry collaboration and UN peacekeeping, with a focus on emerging areas. That gives the relationship a security dimension that goes beyond BRICS or trade.
India does not need Ethiopia to become a naval power. It can instead build a network of regional partners with whom it can cooperate on training, information, capacity building, peacekeeping and broader security concerns.
That becomes more valuable when instability spreads across connected theatres, from Yemen and the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa and the western Indian Ocean.
But What About Ethiopia’s Ties With Iran?
This is the most interesting, and also the easiest part to overstate.
The Houthis are closely aligned with Iran, and Tehran’s support has been an important factor in their military capabilities and regional influence.
Ethiopia also maintains diplomatic relations with Iran. But that does not mean Ethiopia has a command channel to the Houthis. Nor does it mean Addis Ababa can instruct the group to stop attacking shipping.
The more defensible argument is that Ethiopia’s diplomatic relationships can potentially give India another regional interlocutor at a time when Iran’s role in the Red Sea crisis is impossible to ignore.
So, instead of saying “Ethiopia can exercise leverage over the Houthis”, the better formulation is that Ethiopia could give India another diplomatic and regional-security partner at a time when the Red Sea crisis is increasingly connected to Iran and the wider Horn of Africa.
The Ethiopian Calculation
India isn’t the only country interested in Ethiopia’s position.
Addis Ababa has long wanted greater access to the sea. Since Eritrea’s independence left Ethiopia landlocked, the country has relied heavily on neighbouring Djibouti for maritime trade. Its efforts to secure alternative access have become an important part of Horn of Africa geopolitics.
This makes a stable Red Sea particularly important for Ethiopia. And it also explains why closer India-Ethiopia defence and strategic cooperation can have relevance beyond bilateral ties.
India gets a partner with a direct stake in the region. Ethiopia gets a major Asian power with growing maritime and defence capabilities.
Could Ethiopia Help India If Bab el-Mandeb Is Blocked?
Yes, but indirectly.
1. Diplomacy: Ethiopia’s position in Africa and its diplomatic relationships can give India another channel for discussions around Red Sea and Horn security.
2. Defence Cooperation: The emerging India-Ethiopia defence relationship, including training, defence-industry cooperation and peacekeeping, can build long-term security capacity.
3. Regional Intelligence And Coordination: India’s maritime-security interests increasingly depend on understanding what is happening not only at sea but also on the land around the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa.
4. African Diplomacy: With the African Union headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia is an important gateway for India’s engagement with African institutions and governments.
5. Red Sea Resilience: India cannot eliminate the risk of a Bab el-Mandeb disruption. But it can build relationships with countries in and around the affected region, diversify partnerships and strengthen its ability to respond when trade routes are threatened.
The immediate trigger may be the Houthi advance. But the relationship is clearly broader.
India and Ethiopia are now strategic partners. Ethiopia is a BRICS member. Defence cooperation is expanding. And India’s larger strategy in the Horn of Africa is becoming more ambitious. At the same time, the security environment around the Red Sea is deteriorating rapidly.
That makes the PM Modi-Abiy meeting significant not because Ethiopia can somehow “stop the Houthis”, but because India increasingly needs partners on the African side of the Red Sea.
The message is simple: when a maritime chokepoint is under threat, India cannot afford to look only at the ships passing through it. It also has to look at the countries around it. And Ethiopia is emerging as one of those countries.
