Rising inflation, exacerbated by Western-imposed sanctions, alongside restrictions on women's employment, has contributed significantly to Iran's current economic crisis. Compounding these economic grievances are longstanding frustrations within Iranian society regarding the strict social restrictions imposed on women since the theocratic regime assumed power following the 1979 uprising.
These inherent socio-economic challenges have persisted for years, yet civilian efforts to advocate for reform or transformation have been systematically suppressed by authorities closely aligned with the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The ongoing developments underscore the extent to which Iranians have grown disillusioned with the existing system, with their strong display of defiance against the Supreme Leader and the political establishment reflecting a profound desire for comprehensive change in the country.
The swelling protests since December 2025 have fuelled perceptions that the Supreme Leader's influence is weakening, thereby challenging his legitimacy. However, it would be premature to predict the imminent collapse of Iran's theocratic regime.
The prospect of 'regime change', which has gained considerable attention in recent discourse, would require sustained and substantial grassroots mobilisation within Iran to materialise. Without continuous internal pressure, such a political transformation appears to be a formidable undertaking.
Critical questions remain regarding the protestors' resilience in the face of state repression and their capacity to sustain momentum toward the regime's potential downfall.
Furthermore, unlike the 1979 revolution, the ongoing uprising lacks a unifying leadership figure who could serve as the face of the uprising, a factor that may significantly impact its trajectory and effectiveness. While
Amidst these developments, the present Iranian regime is likely to remain resilient in its efforts to preserve theocratic rule, ensuring that the foundational values of the 1979 Islamic Revolution—namely, Shiite ideology—remain intact through the deployment of all means and forces at its disposal. The core objective of the Supreme Leader and his ardent followers, therefore, is to preserve the legitimacy of the theocratic system.
There are, however, several plausible scenarios that merit consideration regarding Iran's internal trajectory.
First, the Iranian regime could become increasingly repressive once the protestors' momentum diminishes in the coming days. While authorities have agreed to halt executions of protestors, particularly following pressure from US President Donald Trump, the possibility of the regime exercising full control over its citizens cannot be ruled out.
Second, the protestors may continue to demonstrate resilience and resolve in their commitment to toppling the regime and achieving political transformation. This outcome, however, would require considerable strength and courage to sustain the movement, along with substantial financial and moral support, as well as the emergence of cohesive leadership to guide the movement's direction. A political vacuum without clear political and strategic vision could plunge the country into far more serious and prolonged socio-political crises.
Third, the regime may find itself compelled to negotiate with the protestors. This scenario remains highly uncertain, as the regime's foundational commitment to preserving Shiite ideology and theocratic rule makes substantive compromise on core socio-cultural principles unlikely, though limited economic reforms may be possible. Beyond Iran's borders, these domestic developments carry significant implications for key regional and international actors with vested interests in the outcome.
Implications for the US, Israel, and the GCC States
Israel: Given its longstanding antagonism with the Islamic Republic of Iran following the 1979 revolution, it is in Israel's utmost interest to witness regime change in Iran, which it perceives as an 'existential threat' to its survival. This outcome represents Israel's preferred resolution to the ongoing crisis. An immediate concern for Israel is the likelihood of Iranian retaliation should the US initiate military operations against Iranian establishments. Iranian leadership has already warned that Tehran would strike back against Israel and U.S. bases in the region, with both adversaries having engaged in direct military confrontations in 2024 and 2025.
However, should the Iranian regime survive this uprising, it will continue to pose a significant challenge for Israel. Even in the event of governmental change in Iran, rebuilding trust between two nations that have been completely estranged since 1979 would require considerable effort and time. For now, defence against potential Iranian attacks remains the top national security priority for the Israeli government.
The United States: Like Israel, the United States seeks a regime in Iran that is amenable to Washington, Israel, and regional allies. Following the bitter legacy of the hostage crisis between November 1979 and January 1981, Iran and the US have remained on opposite ends of the ideological spectrum and continue as adversaries, despite attempts to mend ties in recent years. While the Trump administration favours regime change, it remains uncertain whether this constitutes his top priority given current developments or whether he would be open to negotiating with Iranian leadership to strike a deal and avert a regional catastrophe.
Even if the regime survives internal and external pressures, the US would seek an Iranian leadership that de-emphasises its nuclear programme for military purposes, ceases support for proxies across the wider West Asia, adopts a less antagonistic posture toward Israel and neighbouring Arab states, and limits its strategic alignment with Russia and China.
Successfully negotiating such a deal would provide the Trump administration greater leverage to pursue its West Asian policy with fewer constraints while maintaining checks on Iran's ties with Moscow and Beijing. These demands, however, will be difficult to negotiate given the entrenched mistrust between Tehran and Washington, as well as with Israel. Nonetheless, the possibility of the US deploying military force—including air operations and cyberattacks—against Iranian security establishments linked to the IRGC cannot be ruled out, a scenario that would likely engulf a significant portion of the Middle East, particularly the Gulf region.
The Arab Gulf States: While neighbouring Arab Gulf states may remain relatively unconcerned as long as the uprisings remain confined within Iranian territory, the uncertainty surrounding potential US military action has become a matter of grave concern. Although a weakened Iran would serve the strategic interests of the Gulf states, they are equally opposed to any military adventurism from the US or Israel that could trigger a broader regional conflict. This apprehension stems primarily from the high probability of Iran targeting U.S. military bases located in several GCC states, particularly Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE, as well as in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.
Compounding this concern is the potential disruption that any regional military escalation could cause to oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20 per cent of the world's oil passes. Such a development could severely impact the economies of many regional countries that continue to rely heavily on hydrocarbon trade to generate national income.
Moreover, GCC countries in particular have no desire to be drawn into another conflict at this juncture, as they are undertaking significant socio-economic reform programmes within the framework of economic diversification initiatives aimed at reducing dependency on oil and energy trade. It would also be contrary to the interests of regional countries to disrupt the gradually improving ties with Iran that have developed in recent years. This likely explains why the Saudi government informed Iran that Riyadh would not allow its airspace or base to be used for any military operations against Iran.
Conclusion
The current Iranian uprising underscores the deep-seated socio-political and economic problems that have plagued the country under theocratic rule since 1979. Even if the present phase of unrest subsides in the coming days, the underlying grievances demand substantial structural reforms, particularly to improve living standards across multiple fronts.
Such transformations, however, will be a protracted endeavour, as Iran's challenges are deeply entrenched and cannot be resolved through superficial adjustments alone. The path forward—whether through regime change, negotiated reform, or continued repression—will have profound implications not only for Iran's domestic stability but also for the broader geopolitical landscape of West Asia.
(The author is Deputy Director and Assistant Professor, Symbiosis School of International Studies, Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)
