What is the story about?
Donald Trump’s return to the White House carried with it the grand promise of ending the war in Ukraine within days, a claim that was as theatrical as it was unrealistic. Seven months on, that promise has collided with the reality
of international politics and the stubbornness of Vladimir Putin. Trump’s failure to extract even a temporary pause in hostilities from Moscow is not merely a diplomatic shortcoming; it reflects his inability to distinguish between showmanship and statecraft.
Red-carpet receptions and personal overtures cannot substitute for hard-nosed negotiation and long-term strategy. The very idea that Putin—who has staked both his domestic legitimacy and Russia’s global posture on the war—would simply concede ground because of Trump’s famed “art
of the deal” was a misreading of history and power. The war in Ukraine is not a real estate transaction that can be clinched over a handshake; it is a geopolitical struggle with deep historical roots, and treating it as otherwise was bound to end in failure.
This failure also highlights a consistent pattern in Trump’s political praxis: the reduction of complex global problems into spectacles of personality and improvisation. His handling of trade wars, marked by a cavalcade of tariffs against adversaries and allies alike, displays the
same misplaced faith in unilateral gestures. Tariffs were announced and withdrawn like a magician pulling rabbits from a hat, with little thought to the long-term economic consequences for America or its partners.
In the same vein, his diplomacy with Putin rests on the assumption that intimidation mixed with personal charm can resolve conflicts that are, in fact, structural and historical. Such an approach not only undermines America’s credibility but also erodes the very fabric of international cooperation. Trump’s method of reducing diplomacy
to impulsive theatrics has made foreign policy a stage, but one where the curtain rises to reveal more chaos than resolution.
The ongoing strain in India-US trade relations only reinforces the hollowness of Trump’s transactional approach to diplomacy. His willingness to dangle punitive tariffs on Indian exports—while casually offering to hold them back in exchange for India’s supposed cessation of Russian oil imports—reveals not a strategy but a bargaining tactic better suited for a casino floor than a negotiation between sovereign nations.
The irony, of course, is striking: while lecturing India on its trade with Moscow, Trump himself could not justify America’s continued import of Russian uranium and fertilizers, dismissing the question with a characteristic shrug of ignorance. This double standard not only undermines Washington’s moral high ground but also alienates a critical partner in Asia. For India, whose agricultural and dairy sectors remain the backbone of rural livelihoods, acquiescing to Washington’s demands would not be ideal. Thus, what emerges is not the “art of the deal” but the art of
bluster—policies that neither secure American interests nor respect those of its allies.
It is evident that Trump’s displeasure with India stems from its outright refusal to endorse his unsolicited claim of brokering a ceasefire between India and Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, a rejection that undercut his self-fashioned image as a global dealmaker. In retaliation, the use of steep tariffs and selective economic pressures on New Delhi appears less like coherent policy and more like bullying tactics, designed to remind India of America’s leverage.
It is quite telling that both economists and seasoned strategists in the United States have spoken with one voice in denouncing Trump’s tariff gambit against India. Jeffrey Sachs, a renowned economist and professor at Columbia University, sharply criticised Trump’s tariff decisions, calling them a mere pressure tactic against New Delhi and warning that such steps risk undoing years of progress in India–US relations. He went further to describe the duties as “bizarre” and “self-destructive,” highlighting how they damage America’s own foreign policy interests.
John Bolton, a veteran foreign policy hawk who served as National Security Adviser during Trump’s first administration, also criticised Trump, arguing that penalising India for its oil trade with Russia—while sparing China for doing the same—was a serious strategic miscalculation. He warned that this selective targeting could push India closer toward the Beijing–Moscow axis, calling it an “unforced error” that undermines America’s broader geopolitical goals.
Bolton’s warning likely
carries a deeper strategic charge: by punishing India over Russian oil while overlooking China’s larger energy ties with Moscow, Washington signals that its ire is selective—and New Delhi reads selectivity as unreliability, not leverage. India’s purchases of discounted Russian crude have reached or neared record levels and are central to its inflation management and refining exports; coercive tariffs would mean hardening India’s resolve to keep that lifeline and to hedge more visibly with Moscow.
In that light, Bolton’s “unforced error” critique is less a quip than a diagnosis: tariff theatrics that cancel talks and demand farm-sector concessions don’t align with America’s Indo-Pacific aims and could push India to double down on strategic autonomy in ways that tilt the balance toward a de facto Moscow–Beijing–Delhi accommodation.
What emerges from these developments is an intriguing paradox: Trump, in his quest to arm-twist partners through tariffs and unilateral dictates, may be inadvertently
contributing to the consolidation of a stronger Brics. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva recently declared in Brasília, “I will not call Trump because he does not want to talk. I will call Xi Jinping, I will call Prime Minister Modi. I just won’t call Putin, because Putin can’t travel right now.”
This statement, coming in the wake of Washington’s sweeping 50 per cent tariff on Brazilian imports, reflects not only Lula’s refusal to engage with Trump but also his intent to reaffirm Brazil’s standing by strengthening ties
with leaders of the Global South. Lula’s words carry weight because they signal a deliberate pivot: choosing to prioritise dialogue with Beijing, New Delhi, and other power axes, while sidelining Washington. When placed against the backdrop of rising tariff disputes and diplomatic rifts, the remark suggests that Trump’s approach may inadvertently be encouraging deeper solidarity within Brics, giving it not just economic heft but also fresh political significance as an alternative pole in global affairs.
The Chinese foreign ministry recently remarked that India and China, as “major developing countries and important members of the Global South,” should embrace a “cooperative pas de deux of the dragon and the elephant as partners helping each other succeed,” according to Global Times. In this context, and amid India’s escalating tariff tensions with the United States, reports suggest that Prime Minister Narendra Modi may soon announce the resumption of direct flights between India and China, with a formal deal
expected during his visit to Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit at the end of August—his first trip to China in seven years.
This combination of rhetorical warmth and concrete steps toward engagement reveals Beijing’s desire to recalibrate its strained ties with New Delhi. For China, fostering a working relationship with India not only bolsters its standing in the Global South but also adds strategic depth to Brics at a time when US trade policies are alienating both nations. For India, the outreach presents both an opportunity and a
dilemma: while closer economic ties with Beijing could strengthen its leverage against Washington, they also risk complicating its long-standing concerns over security and territorial disputes.
South Africa, the only African member of Brics and a nation that counts the United States as its second-largest trading partner, has now been slapped with steep 30 per cent tariffs by the Trump administration—the highest imposed on any African country. This move not only strains Pretoria’s economic ties with Washington but also risks accelerating its pivot
toward the Brics framework, where it already finds solidarity with other economies similarly targeted by US trade measures. Instead of pulling South Africa closer, Trump’s tariff offensive may well push it deeper into the Brics fold, reinforcing the bloc’s cohesion against perceived US unilateralism.
The warmth between Russia and India scarcely needs restating, given the long history of strategic trust between the two nations. Even amidst the current tariff struggle with the United States, External Affairs Minister S.
Jaishankar’s recent visit to Moscow underscored the resilience of the partnership, while National Security Adviser Ajit Doval hinted that President Vladimir Putin may soon travel to India. These developments reaffirm that New Delhi and Moscow continue to nurture their ties, regardless of shifting pressures from Washington.
The bottom line is clear: Washington must rethink its approach. First, tariffs are no panacea for America’s economic woes. As Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has pointed out, Trump’s tariff proposals are a
deeply flawed attempt to revive US manufacturing, hurting partners abroad while doing little to address the structural issues at home. Second, it need not play the role of an unsolicited arbitrator in regional disputes and then bristle when its efforts go unacknowledged.
And third and finally, the era of bullying the Global South into compliance through the threat of tariffs is rapidly fading—India, like any sovereign nation, will pursue its own interests, and America’s conflict with Russia cannot simply be imposed on others. Prime
Minister Narendra Modi, in his Independence Day address, underlined this very resolve, declaring that India was prepared to bear the cost of US tariffs rather than compromise its autonomy. His message was clear: India’s economic and strategic decisions will not be dictated by external pressures, no matter how formidable, but will be guided by its own vision of growth, security, and global engagement.
In standing firm, India not only asserts its sovereignty but also signals a larger shift in the global order, where
nations of the Global South are increasingly unwilling to be coerced into choosing sides in conflicts not of their making.
The writer takes special interest in history, culture and geopolitics. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
Red-carpet receptions and personal overtures cannot substitute for hard-nosed negotiation and long-term strategy. The very idea that Putin—who has staked both his domestic legitimacy and Russia’s global posture on the war—would simply concede ground because of Trump’s famed “art
This failure also highlights a consistent pattern in Trump’s political praxis: the reduction of complex global problems into spectacles of personality and improvisation. His handling of trade wars, marked by a cavalcade of tariffs against adversaries and allies alike, displays the
In the same vein, his diplomacy with Putin rests on the assumption that intimidation mixed with personal charm can resolve conflicts that are, in fact, structural and historical. Such an approach not only undermines America’s credibility but also erodes the very fabric of international cooperation. Trump’s method of reducing diplomacy
The ongoing strain in India-US trade relations only reinforces the hollowness of Trump’s transactional approach to diplomacy. His willingness to dangle punitive tariffs on Indian exports—while casually offering to hold them back in exchange for India’s supposed cessation of Russian oil imports—reveals not a strategy but a bargaining tactic better suited for a casino floor than a negotiation between sovereign nations.
The irony, of course, is striking: while lecturing India on its trade with Moscow, Trump himself could not justify America’s continued import of Russian uranium and fertilizers, dismissing the question with a characteristic shrug of ignorance. This double standard not only undermines Washington’s moral high ground but also alienates a critical partner in Asia. For India, whose agricultural and dairy sectors remain the backbone of rural livelihoods, acquiescing to Washington’s demands would not be ideal. Thus, what emerges is not the “art of the deal” but the art of
It is evident that Trump’s displeasure with India stems from its outright refusal to endorse his unsolicited claim of brokering a ceasefire between India and Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, a rejection that undercut his self-fashioned image as a global dealmaker. In retaliation, the use of steep tariffs and selective economic pressures on New Delhi appears less like coherent policy and more like bullying tactics, designed to remind India of America’s leverage.
It is quite telling that both economists and seasoned strategists in the United States have spoken with one voice in denouncing Trump’s tariff gambit against India. Jeffrey Sachs, a renowned economist and professor at Columbia University, sharply criticised Trump’s tariff decisions, calling them a mere pressure tactic against New Delhi and warning that such steps risk undoing years of progress in India–US relations. He went further to describe the duties as “bizarre” and “self-destructive,” highlighting how they damage America’s own foreign policy interests.
John Bolton, a veteran foreign policy hawk who served as National Security Adviser during Trump’s first administration, also criticised Trump, arguing that penalising India for its oil trade with Russia—while sparing China for doing the same—was a serious strategic miscalculation. He warned that this selective targeting could push India closer toward the Beijing–Moscow axis, calling it an “unforced error” that undermines America’s broader geopolitical goals.
Bolton’s warning likely
In that light, Bolton’s “unforced error” critique is less a quip than a diagnosis: tariff theatrics that cancel talks and demand farm-sector concessions don’t align with America’s Indo-Pacific aims and could push India to double down on strategic autonomy in ways that tilt the balance toward a de facto Moscow–Beijing–Delhi accommodation.
What emerges from these developments is an intriguing paradox: Trump, in his quest to arm-twist partners through tariffs and unilateral dictates, may be inadvertently
This statement, coming in the wake of Washington’s sweeping 50 per cent tariff on Brazilian imports, reflects not only Lula’s refusal to engage with Trump but also his intent to reaffirm Brazil’s standing by strengthening ties
The Chinese foreign ministry recently remarked that India and China, as “major developing countries and important members of the Global South,” should embrace a “cooperative pas de deux of the dragon and the elephant as partners helping each other succeed,” according to Global Times. In this context, and amid India’s escalating tariff tensions with the United States, reports suggest that Prime Minister Narendra Modi may soon announce the resumption of direct flights between India and China, with a formal deal
This combination of rhetorical warmth and concrete steps toward engagement reveals Beijing’s desire to recalibrate its strained ties with New Delhi. For China, fostering a working relationship with India not only bolsters its standing in the Global South but also adds strategic depth to Brics at a time when US trade policies are alienating both nations. For India, the outreach presents both an opportunity and a
South Africa, the only African member of Brics and a nation that counts the United States as its second-largest trading partner, has now been slapped with steep 30 per cent tariffs by the Trump administration—the highest imposed on any African country. This move not only strains Pretoria’s economic ties with Washington but also risks accelerating its pivot
The warmth between Russia and India scarcely needs restating, given the long history of strategic trust between the two nations. Even amidst the current tariff struggle with the United States, External Affairs Minister S.
The bottom line is clear: Washington must rethink its approach. First, tariffs are no panacea for America’s economic woes. As Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has pointed out, Trump’s tariff proposals are a
And third and finally, the era of bullying the Global South into compliance through the threat of tariffs is rapidly fading—India, like any sovereign nation, will pursue its own interests, and America’s conflict with Russia cannot simply be imposed on others. Prime
In standing firm, India not only asserts its sovereignty but also signals a larger shift in the global order, where
The writer takes special interest in history, culture and geopolitics. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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