The My Lai Massacre, a horrific event on March 16, 1968, where U.S. soldiers murdered hundreds of unarmed Vietnamese civilians, is often viewed as a singular tragedy. However, historical analysis suggests that My Lai was not an isolated incident but rather a stark manifestation of a wider pattern of atrocities and a pervasive culture of violence within the U.S. military during the Vietnam War. This perspective argues that the conditions that led to My Lai,
including the dehumanization of Vietnamese people and a top-down tolerance for violence, fostered an environment where such war crimes could occur repeatedly, often unpunished and unpublicized.
A Culture of Dehumanization and Casual Murder
American behavior during the My Lai Massacre reflected a deeply ingrained culture of casual murder and widespread racial contempt for the local Vietnamese population within the U.S. military. This dehumanization was reinforced from the earliest stages of military training, where drill instructors would refer to Vietnamese people not by their nationality but by derogatory terms such as "dinks," "gooks," "slopes," "slants," "rice-eaters," and "animals." This language fostered an environment where Vietnamese individuals were seen as less than human, making it easier for soldiers to commit acts of violence against them.
Service in Vietnam further solidified these attitudes, with American troops often instructed to distrust all Vietnamese. According to one veteran, the "enemy is anything with slant eyes who lives in the village. It doesn't make any difference if it's a woman or child." Another officer reportedly stated, "So a few women and children get killed. Teach 'em a damn good lesson. They're all VC or at least helping them. You can't convert them, only kill them." This pervasive sentiment meant that American units frequently shared racial contempt or hatred for all local Vietnamese, regardless of their affiliation, age, or status, blurring the lines between combatants and civilians and enabling widespread atrocities.
Top-Down Tolerance and the "Mere Gook Rule"
American atrocities were further enabled by a culture of top-down tolerance, where accountability for war crimes was often sidestepped, and perpetrators received solidarity rather than severe punishment. This was evident in the aftermath of My Lai, where Captain Medina was acquitted, and the judge reportedly wished him a happy birthday. Following Lieutenant William Calley's conviction, the White House received 5,000 telegrams expressing support for him, and American soldiers vandalized buildings in Saigon with messages like "KILL A GOOK FOR CALLEY." Even President Nixon, in response to the American press covering My Lai, reportedly attributed the coverage to "dirty rotten Jews from New York."
Some authors argue that the light punishments for low-level personnel and the unwillingness to hold higher officials responsible were part of a pattern. This pattern was influenced by the "body-count strategy" and the "Mere Gook Rule," which encouraged U.S. soldiers to prioritize killing suspected Vietnamese enemies, even when there was a high probability they were civilians. This approach, Nick Turse argues, contributed to the common occurrence of lesser-known massacres similar to My Lai and a broader pattern of war crimes throughout Vietnam.
My Lai as an "Operation, Not an Aberration"
Nick Turse, citing Ronald Ridenhour, described the atrocities at My Lai as "an operation, not an aberration," suggesting that such events were not isolated incidents but rather a systemic part of the war. He contends that many similar war crimes occurred in Vietnam, often stemming from deliberate policies, and frequently went unphotographed or undocumented. Investigations into these incidents were often abandoned or suppressed by higher authorities, and whistleblowers were threatened or smeared to silence their testimonies.
The inquiries into My Lai, for instance, uncovered evidence of other war crimes committed concurrently by Bravo Company of the 4/3rd Infantry, yet these revelations resulted in no convictions. Turse highlights how My Lai and other atrocities followed similar patterns, driven by the desire to maximize enemy "body counts" and the creation of "free-fire zones." Beyond massacres, American troops routinely burned entire villages in the Vietnamese countryside, sometimes for revenge after a booby trap, or simply to vent rage against any Vietnamese they encountered. Operation Speedy Express, led by General Julian Ewell, serves as another example, where the U.S. 9th Division killed thousands of Vietnamese civilians in the Mekong Delta between December 1968 and May 1969. An Inspector General report from 1972 estimated civilian casualties in this operation to be between 5,000 and 7,000, despite an official enemy body count of 10,899. This evidence strongly supports the argument that My Lai was a symptom of a much larger, systemic issue within the conduct of the war.
