In September 1980, a serious nuclear weapons incident, known as the Damascus Titan missile explosion, unfolded in rural Arkansas. This event involved a U.S. Air Force LGM-25C Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at Missile Complex 374-7. The incident, which began with a fuel leak and culminated in a powerful explosion, highlighted the inherent dangers associated with handling such potent weaponry. Despite the destructive force of the blast,
the missile's W-53 nuclear warhead was ejected safely, preventing a nuclear detonation and the release of radioactive material, a testament to its built-in safety features.
The Genesis of the Crisis: A Dropped Wrench and a Leaking Tank
The chain of events leading to the explosion began on September 18, 1980, at approximately 6:30 p.m. CDT. An airman from the 308th Missile Maintenance Squadron was performing maintenance at Launch Complex 374-7, adding pressure to the second stage oxidizer tank of the Titan II missile. During this procedure, the airman accidentally dropped an 8-pound socket wrench. The wrench fell 70 feet down the silo, bounced off a thrust mount, and critically punctured the pressurized first stage fuel tank, which contained aerozine 50. This seemingly minor accident initiated a major crisis, as the highly volatile fuel began to leak.
Upon detection of the leak, the crew in the launch control center was evacuated, and military and civilian response teams were quickly dispatched to manage the hazardous situation. The Titan II missile utilized hypergolic propellants—nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) as the oxidizer and Aerozine 50 (a 50/50 mix of hydrazine and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine, UDMH) as the fuel. These propellants ignite on contact, making any leak extremely dangerous due to their toxicity and corrosiveness. The immediate concern was the potential for an explosion, prompting authorities to advise civilian evacuations in the surrounding area.
The Perilous Entry and Escalating Danger
As the fuel tank continued to leak for nearly six hours, the situation grew increasingly precarious. Early in the morning of September 19, the first individuals to enter the silo complex were Senior Airmen John "Greg" Devlin and Rex Hukle. The on-site command team had been evacuated, meaning there was no one available to electronically unlock the entry gate or open the portal entry door. Devlin and Hukle were instructed to cut through the security fence using 3-foot-long bolt cutters. They then proceeded to the underground entry portal, descended 15 steps, and used a crowbar and bolt cutters to force open the steel-framed portal door.
Once inside, they encountered a locked, caged-in area, typically used for providing top-secret entry codes to the commander. They had to manually break through this locked door as well. After descending approximately 35 feet down the stairwell, they reached the first of two blast doors, Door #6, which led to the blast lock area. Their objective was to access the Vapor Detector Annunciator Panel (VDAP) located in this area. Devlin and Hukle attempted to retract a locking pin using a manual hydraulic pump, but within minutes, they began running low on breathing air in their Rocket Fuel Handler Clothing Outfits (RFHCO) suits and were ordered to return topside. They were relieved by Senior Airman David Lee Livingston and Sergeant Jeff K. Kennedy, who, finding the security gate and portal doors already open, proceeded to Door #6. However, their vapor detectors indicated an explosive atmosphere, leading to an order for them to evacuate.
The Explosion and Its Aftermath
Despite the clear danger, the team was subsequently ordered to reenter the silo to turn on an exhaust fan. Senior Airman Livingston reentered the silo to carry out this order. Shortly thereafter, at about 3:00 a.m., the hypergolic fuel exploded. The explosion was likely triggered by arcing in the exhaust fan. The initial blast was immense, catapulting the 743-ton silo door away from the silo and ejecting the missile's second stage and warhead. Once clear of the silo, the second stage also exploded.
The W53 thermonuclear warhead, with a yield of 9 megatons, landed approximately 100 feet from the launch complex's entry gate. Crucially, its safety features functioned as designed, preventing any loss of radioactive material or a nuclear detonation. The explosion resulted in one fatality, Senior Airman David Lee Livingston, and injured 21 other personnel, all from the emergency response team from Little Rock Air Force Base. The blast created a crater 250 feet in diameter and blew the 740-ton launch tube cover 200 feet into the air. This incident, classified as a "Broken Arrow" event, underscored the critical importance of safety protocols and the robust design of nuclear warhead safety mechanisms.
