Launched in 1961, the Alliance for Progress was presented as a comprehensive program for economic, social, and political development in Latin America. However, its origins and implementation were deeply intertwined with the geopolitical realities of the Cold War. In the wake of the Cuban Revolution, the United States under President John F. Kennedy sought to counter the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere. The Alliance was thus conceived
not just as a humanitarian aid initiative, but as a strategic tool to promote stability, foster democratic institutions, and prevent further revolutionary movements by addressing the root causes of discontent.
Countering Revolutionary Influence
The context of the Cuban Revolution loomed large over the creation of the Alliance for Progress. The success of Fidel Castro's revolution in 1959 sent shockwaves through Washington, highlighting the potential for similar movements in other Latin American nations grappling with poverty, inequality, and political instability. The Alliance was explicitly designed as a means to counteract this influence and offer an alternative path to development. By supporting reformist measures and democratic governance, the U.S. aimed to demonstrate that progress could be achieved through evolutionary rather than revolutionary means.
This strategic objective was evident in Cuba's reaction to the Alliance. Cuba notably opposed signing the final agreement at the Conference of Punta del Este in 1961, a move that was not surprising given that the Alliance was created, in part, to counter the influence of its revolution. The U.S. saw leaders like Víctor Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia, Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela, and Eduardo Frei Montalva of Chile as models for the kind of reformist, democratic leadership it wished to support through the Alliance. The program aimed to strengthen ties between the United States and Latin America, promoting economic growth and social progress as bulwarks against communist ideology.
Economic Aid as a Political Lever
The Kennedy administration did not shy away from using economic aid as a political instrument within the framework of the Alliance for Progress. Between 1961 and 1963, the U.S. demonstrated its willingness to exert pressure on governments it disfavored by suspending economic assistance or breaking off diplomatic relations. This occurred with several countries, including Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Peru. These suspensions, which lasted for periods ranging from three weeks to six months, underscored the political dimension of the aid program and the U.S. desire to influence internal political structures in the region.
Furthermore, the Alliance had ties to a significant increase in U.S. military aid to Latin American countries. While the program emphasized economic and social development, the underlying Cold War imperative meant that security concerns were never far from the surface. This increased military assistance contributed to the rise of militarization in the region, a development that ironically undermined the Alliance's stated goal of promoting democratic governance. A portion of this military aid was directed towards institutions like the School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone, where many future military leaders, some of whom would later lead authoritarian regimes, received training. This dual approach of economic development and military support reflected the complex and often contradictory nature of U.S. Cold War policy in Latin America.
Shifting Priorities and the Rockefeller Report
By the late 1960s, the initial enthusiasm for the Alliance for Progress had waned, and its perceived failures led to a re-evaluation of U.S. policy in Latin America. Shortly after taking office, President Richard Nixon commissioned a study in February 1969 to assess the state of the region. He appointed his political rival, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, to lead this effort. Rockefeller and his advisors undertook four trips to Latin America in early 1969, which often proved to be embarrassing due to widespread anti-U.S. sentiment and demonstrations.
Rockefeller's report highlighted "general frustration over the failure to achieve a more rapid improvement in standards of living," with the United States often blamed due to its association with the Alliance's unfulfilled expectations. The report noted that demonstrations, initially stemming from local grievances, were often "taken over and exacerbated by anti-US and subversive elements which sought to weaken the United States, and their own governments in the process." A major recommendation from the Rockefeller report was a reduction of U.S. involvement, stating, "we, in the United States, cannot determine the internal political structure of any other nation." This marked a shift away from using economic aid as a primary political tool, suggesting there was little the U.S. could or should do to change political atmospheres in other countries. This justification ultimately led to a reduction in economic aid to Latin America, though the report did call for some aid to continue through more effective programs, signaling a recalibration of U.S. Cold War strategy in the region.
