Pakistan has stepped forward with what it calls a “two-phased” plan to end the conflict involving the United States, Israel and Iran. First, stop the fighting.
Then, work out whatever remains unresolved.
Phase one: Pause first
The proposal, dubbed the “Islamabad Accord”, envisages an immediate ceasefire alongside the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. That is phase one of the two-pronged “truce plan”. In a war that has escalated rapidly, the instinct to prioritise a pause is understandable. A ceasefire offers relief, lowers temperatures and creates space for diplomacy. But it also shifts the harder questions into the future, where they tend to return with greater force.
That, however, does not appear to be Pakistan’s immediate concern.
‘Open the strait right away’ demands Pak; ‘No way’ says Iran
At the centre of this first phase is the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the critical artery for global energy supplies disrupted by the conflict. Islamabad’s logic is clear, even if somewhat quixotic: stabilise the situation, restore oil flows and prevent further escalation.
The rest, for now, can wait.
However, Iranian officials have stressed that reopening Hormuz cannot be tied to a temporary ceasefire. Nor is there much appetite for externally imposed timelines while attacks continue.
Phase two: Figure out the real issues later
The second phase allows for a 15 to 20-day window after the ceasefire to negotiate a wider settlement. It is expected to outline a regional mechanism for managing the Strait of Hormuz, with final in-person negotiations planned in Pakistan’s capital. The eventual agreement could include Iran committing not to develop nuclear weapons in return for sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets, according to an Al Jazeera report.
If the first phase of Islamabad’s plan is about speed, the second phase is about substance. This is where questions around Iran’s nuclear programme, sanctions relief and frozen assets come into play.
These are not new issues. They are precisely the ones that have resisted resolution for years.
There is talk of a broader framework, possibly formalised through talks in Islamabad. The proposed “Islamabad Accord” is meant to convert a pause in fighting into something more durable. But it also postpones the most difficult conversations to a later stage, where agreement may prove even harder.
Truce first or trust first? Pak’s sequencing vs Iran’s scepticism
Pakistan, positioning itself as the main channel between Washington and Tehran, appears to be relying on momentum. The assumption is that once guns fall silent, negotiations will follow. That assumption is doing much of the heavy lifting. What it fails to realise is that without a ceasefire that holds, the prospect of serious negotiations remains uncertain. Even if talks begin, there is no guarantee that long-standing disagreements will suddenly become easier to resolve.
Tehran has clearly signalled that it does not see the sequencing in the same way as Islamabad. And the gap here is not just diplomatic. It is conceptual. Pakistan’s plan suggests that trust can emerge from a ceasefire. Iran appears to believe that trust must come first. The difference is not merely tactical. It is fundamental.
What comes first? Pakistan assumes a truce must precede trust. Iran is clear that without trust, a truce will not hold.
Pakistan’s ‘frantic diplomacy’ shows effort, not influence
According to a Reuters report, Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, was in contact “all night long” with US Vice President JD Vance, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, negotiating this two-phase deal. Al Jazeera described the effort, in the words of Pakistani officials, as “frantic diplomacy”. That description is telling.
Islamabad’s involvement has been energetic, even relentless. It has engaged US officials, Iranian leadership and other intermediaries, attempting to bridge gaps and keep channels open.
But Islamabad’s role as messenger, mediator, and, at times, interpreter reflects access, not necessarily influence. Engaging multiple sides is one thing. Aligning their interests is another, and that requires diplomatic depth Pakistan has hitherto not demonstrated. At least not consistently.
Pakistan has built a certain degree of faith into the effort. The belief that a conflict shaped by strategic rivalry and deep suspicion can be paused through a two-step framework is not unambitious. Whether ambition alone is enough to sustain peace is another matter.
For now, the proposal offers a sketch, not a solution. It suggests movement, but not necessarily convergence.
The two-phase truce plan also reflects a diplomatic instinct the world has come to associate with Islamabad. Move quickly to contain immediate damage, then attempt to resolve the underlying causes. At times, “resolution” risks becoming deferral. Difficult conversations are often brushed under the carpet. This time, perhaps it will be under a Persian rug.
This is what makes the approach risky. A ceasefire built on unresolved tensions can be difficult to sustain. A settlement built on fragile trust can be difficult to enforce.
Behind the diplomacy, Pakistan is protecting its own fuel lifeline
Why, then, is Islamabad so “frantic” to stop the war? The answer is straightforward: Pakistan is trying to secure its own interests, cloaked as mediation, amid escalating hostilities. Nothing surprising there. After all, when has Islamabad shown altruism?
In this case, the pressure stems from a crucial international waterway. The Strait of Hormuz, a key artery for global fuel supplies, remains under a de facto Iranian blockade. Pakistan imports roughly 85 per cent of its fuel through this route for oil and LNG from Qatar and the UAE. That dependence makes Islamabad acutely vulnerable to disruptions in West Asia.
In an already strained and inflation-hit economy, fuel price hikes have had cascading effects. Transport costs have risen, and prices of food and essential goods have surged. Petrol and diesel prices jumped sharply in early March, disrupting Ramazan and Eid for many households. Fuel prices are currently reported at around PKR 378 per litre, roughly Rs 125 in Indian currency.
While Islamabad is exploring alternative routes, such as the Red Sea port of Yanbu in Saudi Arabia, to bypass the strait, the Shahbaz Sharif government risks public backlash as inflation continues to climb.
Islamabad’s mediation meets a wall of mistrust
The “Islamabad Accord” enters a landscape where mistrust is not incidental. It is the defining feature of relations between Tehran and Washington. Iran has already rejected earlier proposals from the United States, describing them as “unrealistic” and “one-sided”. Security concerns remain central. Continued strikes have reinforced doubts about guarantees, particularly regarding leadership safety and long-term commitments. While Iran has given Pakistan’s mediation efforts an uncertain nod, it has also made clear that its immediate focus remains on security amid ongoing attacks by the US and Israel.
The United States, for its part, has yet to formally respond to Pakistan’s proposal. That silence adds another layer of uncertainty to an already fragile process. At this stage, the distance between positions remains considerable.
In a conflict shaped by distrust and competing priorities, stopping the fighting may be the easier part. What comes after is where the real test begins. And that is where the “Islamabad Accord” — and Pakistan’s diplomacy — will ultimately be judged.
