For much of 2025, the Texas Longhorns spent the first quarter searching for itself. Drives stalled before midfield. Early-down runs created long third downs. Explosive plays came inconsistently, and opponents were often allowed to settle into games before the Longhorn offense ever established control. By the end of the season, fast starts felt more like a anomalies than an identity.
Meanwhile, in 2024, Texas more effectively used the opening 15 minutes to establish control. The offense created explosive
plays early, played ahead of schedule, and frequently forced opponents to react immediately to Steve Sarkisian’s scripted sequences.
So, what changed?
While it’d be nice to pin the issue on one thing, the reality is the first quarter offensive struggles (and successes) can come from a mix of factors. One could point the finger just about anywhere — new personnel, questionable play calling, an inexperienced quarterback, a nonexistent run game. The list goes on and on.
The decline was not necessarily dramatic enough to derail the offense entirely, but it was noticeable. Texas still moved the ball, still generated scoring opportunities, and still possessed elite talent across the field. The difference was in how efficiently and aggressively those advantages translated early in games. The offense became more methodical, less explosive, and at times overly dependent on settling in over the course of four quarters rather than overwhelming defenses immediately.
This article examines how Texas’ first quarter production changed from 2024 to 2025, where those declines appeared, and which personnel factors most likely contributed to the offense losing some of its early game advantages.
First-quarter scoring
First-quarter scoring is distinct from other parts of the game. Offenses utilize an opening script, predetermined plays to exploit advantages, rather than calling plays on the fly. Coaches will often use the script to get a feel for the opposing defense, settle a quarterback in, and establish balance. Similar to boxers feeling each other out in the first few rounds, coaching staffs often look to collect information for future play calls in addition to scoring.
In 2024, the Longhorn offense averaged 8.1 points in the first quarter, which slotted at 11th in the country. To put it plainly, Texas put up points in the first quarter. A year later, the offense averaged 6.1 points in the first, while dropping 40 slots to 51st in the nation.
Let’s look at some of the differences between each year. The 2024 offense scored 129 total points on 42 possessions in three more games while the 2025 offense notched 79 points on 33 possessions. In SEC play, the 2024 team scored in six of the eight (75.0 percent) first quarters, while the 2025 offense scored in only half (four) of conference games.
A complicating data point has to do with turnovers — the 2024 offense turned the ball over eight times in the first quarter while the 2025 offense had zero first-quarter turnovers. None. So, the 2024 offense was more explosive, but also highly variable compared to 2025. Texas’ first-quarter offense in 2025 became less explosive, less productive, and more methodical. Sure, they turned the ball over less, but they also were shut out more frequently. Eliminating self-inflicted Q1 disasters also removed some of the aggressive volatility that produced its highest-scoring quarters in 2024.
Looking at first-quarter success at home versus on the road is perhaps the most informative aspect in dissecting the difference between 2024 and 2025. In 2024, the Texas offense averaged 9.63 points in the first quarter at home and 6.5 points away from DKR.
In 2025, the Longhorns offense was inexplicably more explosive at home, averaging 10.8 points in the first (12.15 percent increase), compared to 1.86 points on the road or at neutral sites (71.38 percent decrease). Sarkisian and Manning were horrendous in the first quarter at any stadium not named DKR. The pitiful showings at opposing stadiums or neutral sites raises questions as a standalone metric but is further compounded by the year-over-year changes. A 70-plus percent change is hard to understand.
The struggles in the first quarter on the road can be somewhat used as an explanation for the three losses. Against Ohio State, Florida, and Georgia, the Texas offense scored three points on six possessions in the first quarter. It’s difficult for most offenses to succeed at any of those stadiums, but Sarkisian and the Longhorns are not expected to be most offenses — they are expected to perform better than most, and quite frankly, three points on six possessions is subpar for any program.
For the Longhorns moving forward, neutralizing raucous crowds and immediately attacking with high-percentage throws to playmakers in space will need to be priotirzed on the road if Texas hopes to improve.
Opening possessions
In 2024, Texas’ opening drives were defined by volatility and high-variance outcomes. Across 16 games, Texas scored on its opening possession five times (31.25 percent), with all five being touchdowns, while also missing two field goal attempts (12.5 percent).
The rest of the time, drives were split between four punts (25 percent), four interceptions (25 percent), and one turnover on downs (6.25 percent).
What does this tell us?
Over half of all opening possessions either ended with a punt or immediately handed momentum back to the opponent. That inconsistency was heavily tied to game environment — at home, Texas was far more explosive early, while road and neutral-site SEC games produced more stalled drives and turnovers.
The 2024 offense did not score an opening-drive possession in any of their four away games. At home, opening drives resulted in a touchdown or field-goal attempt in five of seven games. Sarkisian and Ewers were remarkably more effective at home on opening possessions.
The split between having the ball first or second also mattered. Texas was noticeably more efficient when it opened the game on defense. In six contests where the Longhorns had the ball second, they scored four touchdowns (66.6 percent) compared to just one touchdown (10.0 percent) when opening the game with the ball. The Longhorns didn’t score when receiving the ball first in their first six tries. It wasn’t until the game against Kentucky that the Longhorns scored to open the game, a drive that required Ewers to complete 6-of-7 passes for 58 yards and a touchdown.
That’s all to say, opening-possession scoring for the 2024 offense was highly variable and arguably a struggle. Whether poor scripted plays, nerves, or another unknown factor that led to successful outcomes at home, second possession starts were much more likely to end in points.
Moving to the 2025 team, which saw a drop in overall first-quarter production despite eliminating turnovers. When examining the opening possession for the 2025 team, the overall numbers are better than in 2024, especially as the season progressed, however, the profile of opening drives in both years looks nearly identical.
In 2025, the opening-drive touchdown rate was 30.8 percent compared to 31.3 percent in 2024, yet the 2025 offense scored on 46.2 percent of initial possessions, which was a drastic improvement from the 31.3 percent in 2024.
So what changed?
The difference was field goals. The Longhorns missed two opening drive field goals in 2024 while converting both attempts in 2025.
Another positive note on opening possessions for the 2025 offense was the improvement as the season progressed. The Longhorns scored one time on opening possessions in the first seven games. In the final six games, Texas scored five times on opening possessions.
After the disaster in Lexington, Texas scored consectuive opening driving touchdowns to open that six-game stretch and figured something out as a whole.
Sarkisian and company simplified the opening possession by prioritizing getting the ball to playmakers in space. After the horrendous seven game start, Sarkisian opened the next two games by isolating star wide receiver Ryan Wingo with the ball and a head of steam. Against Mississippi State, Wingo turned on the jets for a 60-yard gain on the Longhorns’ first play from scrimmage.
Sarkisian called nearly the same play a week later and this time Wingo scampered for a 75-yard touchdown against Vanderbilt.
The Texas offense continued in the right direction by creating mismatches in space to open the game rather than forcing a struggling ground game.
As mentioned, the 2025 offense struggled mightily away from DKR in the first quarter. Zooming in on opening possessions, the Longhorns performance on the road resembles the entire 2025 season — Texas was shutout in their first three opening possessions on the road, but scored on both opening possessions after the Kentucky game.
As a whole, opening possessions don’t show much of a difference between the 2024 and 2025 offenses. Both scored touchdowns at a similar rate with the 2025 converting on field goal attempts while punting rather turning the ball over.
The trend for the 2025 offense is encouraging. Sarkisian and Manning were able to score more regularly as the season progressed.
So, what changed?
The differing outcomes between the 2024 and 2025 first-quarter offenses were not the result of a single difference, but rather a combination of personnel turnover, quarterback change, and a noticeable difference in how Steve Sarkisian structured early-game sequencing. In 2024, Texas’ opening scripts leaned heavily on vertical stress and early-down aggression, often relying on timing routes and boundary throws to establish rhythm. That version of the offense was more volatile by design, but it also created explosive scoring when execution aligned.
In 2025, Sarkisian had a struggling offensive line and a new quarterback. The personnel profile of the offense had subtly but meaningfully changed, and it took half a dozen games before Manning and Sarkisian seemed to mesh.
In 2024, when the script was clean and the protections held up, Texas was able to push the ball downfield and actually call some of those longer-developing concepts. In 2025, even small amounts of early pressure seemed to change things pretty quickly, with Sarkisian and the offense getting into quicker plays and cutting back on those slower-developing plays that used to generate chunk yardages in the first quarter.
After building the 2024 offense to explode, Sarkisian opted for safer plays in 2025 to open the game. He prioritized fewer catastrophic plays at the cost of a higher ceiling. Sarkisian also seemed to push his system on the offense until the middle of the season when Texas simplified looks and leaned into space creation for its most dynamic receiver, Wingo, rather than asking the entire offense to function at full speed from the jump.
Regardless of reasoning, it’s nearly impossible to argue that the first quarter offense didn’t regress between seasons; however, understanding the difference between attacking and mitigating risks can provide somewhat of an explanation for some of the lack of production.
With that being said, attempting to understand the reason for such monumental struggles on the road is more complicated and likely a result of a combination of factors. Crowd noise and early defensive pressure forced quicker decisions, which pushed Texas away from play calls that it leaned on at home.
No matter who or why the offense struggled, Sarkisian, Manning, and the entire Texas offenses need to improve in the first quarter, particularly on the road, if they hope to reach their potential in 2026.
