Back on December 20 — during the Golden State Warriors’ Chase Center rematch against the Phoenix Suns —Steph Curry had the ball in his hands on the right wing, with four other Warriors players spread out on the floor in an attempt to create as much space as possible for him to operate, either in isolation or off of a potential pick-and-roll situation.
Jimmy Butler — being guarded by center Mark Williams — comes up to set a ball screen for Curry, with Draymond Green at the top of the arc one pass away.
With teams not being fearful of Green’s ability to shoot the ball, this places his defender (Dillon Brooks) in a position to help off easily at the gap. When Butler sets the screen for Curry to drive to his left, Curry sees Brooks at the gap, ready to obstruct his driving lane:
With Collin Gillespie caught against Butler’s screen, Williams is compelled to step up and commit to a switch against Curry, while Brooks tries to stay put at the gap despite Green drifting deeper toward the wing. Not wanting Williams to take Curry in isolation, Gillespie attempts to recover toward Curry instead of sticking to Butler, perhaps in an effort to double Curry and pressure him at the point of attack. Meanwhile, Devin Booker stays fairly attached to Moses Moody in the corner, with Royce O’Neale being the low man guarding Quinten Post in the weak-side corner.
With Gillespie attempting to recover toward Curry, Butler rolls toward the rim. Despite the temptation to rotate toward Butler, Booker either chooses not to switch onto Butler or is distracted by Moody’s “shake” (i.e., lift) from the corner toward the wing. Gillespie realizes mid-recovery that Butler slipped toward the rim and attempts to veer back toward him. By the time he realizes it, however, it is well too late:
Believe it or not, this was one of only 16 possessions that was finished with a Butler roll to the rim. While taking the low volume of attempts into account, the Warriors have scored a brisk 1.438 points per possession that finished with Butler as the roll man this season. Of those 16 possessions, seven have involved Curry as the ball handler, including the possession above.
Against the New York Knicks, the Warriors ran the Curry-Butler pick-and-roll in the second quarter. As opposed to a settled half-court possession, the pick-and-roll comes in the form of a drag screen by Butler in transition, a sped-up play coming off of a made free throw. The speed of the maneuver — Butler quickly slips the screen instead of setting a solid pick — catches the Knicks defense off guard. Even while Josh Hart tries to help off of the lifting Moody, the ball is already in Butler’s hands by the time any sort of help collapses toward the paint:
This brings into light how potent and effective the Curry-Butler tandem has been when both of them are directly involved with each other. While Steve Kerr has opted to keep these actions in the holster — in true Kerr fashion, unleashing them in high-stakes situations that call for an easy and reliable source of buckets — he has slowly been more lenient with its usage during “normal” situations, such as in the instance above.
During another Curry-Butler pick-and-roll possession — this time, against the Orlando Magic — the Magic opt to defend using a more conservative drop coverage against Curry, with the rationale being to keep themselves from having to rotate by keeping the on-ball action a virtual two-on-two. That requires sound execution at the point of the screen — i.e, the on-ball defender has to be able to stick to Curry in order to prevent him from punishing a drop coverage (which is a coverage typically discouraged against the greatest pull-up shooter of all time).
With Butler “ghosting” the screen and slipping toward the rim, Anthony Black is able to maintain contact with Curry around the screen, allowing Paolo Banchero to calmly contain Curry’s drive. As a result, the Magic defense is allowed to stay home without the need to rotate:
However, the lack of rotation may have been too much of an under-indulgence by the Magic, seeing as Butler is practically allowed to roll to the rim without any impediment. Typically, Brandin Podziemski’s defender (Jett Howard) would “tag” Butler on the roll. But with Podziemski lifting slightly, Howard opts to stay attached. Curry engages Banchero on the drive and makes the pass to the rolling Butler, whose speed on the roll allows him to get to the rim faster than Banchero’s ability to contest the shot:
The Warriors have been experimenting with this setup when it comes to the little details: screening angles, the nature of the screen (solid picks, “ghosted” slips, drag screens, etc.), and counters to whichever pick-and-roll coverage the defense chooses to run. With regard to how the Knicks chose how to play the Curry-Butler pick-and-roll, they employed the typical two-to-the-ball coverage that allowed Butler to slip inside in the clip above.
Curiously, they also chose to have OG Anunoby play drop coverage, a decision the Warriors chose to counter by having Butler set the screen higher, near the center logo. With Anunoby in deep drop position, Miles McBride gets chipped by Butler’s screen — enough for Curry to pull up for the three:
When drop didn’t work, the Knicks resorted to switching the screen altogether, which had Butler being guarded by the smaller (6-foot-2) McBride. However, the Knicks are bailed out by an early clock three-point attempt by Draymond Green, who chooses to take the shot instead of moving the ball around till it found its way to Butler:
It’s a no brainer that the Warriors’ offense has excelled with both Curry and Butler on the floor. In 537 minutes, the duo has allowed the Warriors to score 123.0 points per 100 possessions — better than all but one of the 30 teams in the league in terms of offense, with the Denver Nuggets’ 123.4 points per 100 possessions being the only one that is slightly better.
It goes without saying that the reverse situation of the Curry-Butler pick-and-roll — the Butler-Curry inverted pick-and-roll, in which Curry sets the screen for the ball-handling Butler — is just as effective and equally potent.
When Butler finds himself matched up against the 6-foot-7, 240-pound Anunoby, it isn’t necessarily a matchup that is favorable for Butler and the Warriors. Anunoby is a robust and strong defender who virtually ran through almost every defender matched up against him on the Warriors, while he is equally hard to budge as a defender. Butler doesn’t necessarily profile as someone who can match — let alone surpass — Anunoby in a contest of strength.
The smart thing to do would be to find a way to get Anunoby off of Butler, who gets the ball on the right side of the floor all to himself. Curry, who made the initial outlet pass to Butler, trails behind the play, seemingly uninvolved — that is, until he comes over to set a “snug” ball screen for Butler.
McBride has no choice but to switch onto Butler, who spins his way toward the rim as soon as McBride jumps out to switch:
This direct linkage between the Warriors’ two best players by every account — eye-test, advanced statistics, etc. — has generated plenty of efficient offense for the team. Based on Dunks & Threes’ Estimated Plus-Minus metric, the Warriors happen to be one of two teams (the other being the Oklahoma City Thunder) with two players within the top 15 of overall EPM: Curry (plus-5.5, 5th) and Butler (plus-4.4, 13th). But one shouldn’t need these metrics to conclude that whenever your two best offensive players create advantages for each other, the entire offensive machinery benefits exponentially.
