Watching the games since the start of the season, I realized that Phoenix is trying to play more “sound” basketball than in previous years. Screens are set, cuts are made, actions flow, and the team tries to find open spots. But when the defense holds, when the first intention creates nothing, when only a few seconds remain…that’s when shot‑making comes into play.
I started wondering where the team stands this season in that area, and as expected, their score has dropped compared to previous seasons.
But is it a lack of talent, or simply the early signs of a style of play that no longer leaves room for chaos?
What is Shot‑Making?
In 2025‑26, shot‑making is no longer plan A, nor even plan B. It has become a tool, a last resort, a skillset that complements, rather than replaces, the collective game. In 2014, 12 teams had a shot‑making score above +0.30 (meaning the team scored 0.30 points more than expected based on shot quality). In 2020, only 7 teams reached that mark. This season, only 4 remain: New York (0.49), the Clippers (0.42), Milwaukee (0.41), and Boston (0.32).
What’s happening in Phoenix (0.17 this season, compared to 0.94 in 2024 and 0.62 in 2025) isn’t a local anomaly. It’s part of a league‑wide trend. This drop is normal. Defensive talent is catching up with offensive talent; coaches no longer allow opposing stars to freely express themselves, maximizing help, traps, and coverage schemes. A few years ago, these kinds of shots were “easier” in a more individualistic league. The pace has also increased: teams attack earlier in the clock or before the defense is set, favoring “easier” shots.
But what is it, concretely?
Shot‑making is the ability to convert difficult shots in conditions where most players or teams would be inefficient. It’s a mix of individual technique (in other words: the offensive bag), defensive or temporal pressure, and efficiency despite everything. Shot‑making is not a playstyle, nor a system. No team builds its offense around it. It’s a skill, a talent that can differentiate certain types of players.
Take Stephen Curry, for example, who statistically and visually is the greatest shot‑maker in history (peak of 5.68 in 2016), simply because he is an absolute threat anywhere on the halfcourt, whether he’s contested by Victor Wembanyama or has 2 seconds left on the clock. Another textbook case: Kevin Durant. His range may be less extreme than the Chef’s, but in his spots, after one dribble or simply in catch‑and‑shoot, the net shakes almost automatically (4.82 in 2014).
In short, individual shot‑making is the ability of a player to create his own shot…and make it even when the defense has done its job. Extended to a team, it’s the ability to manufacture difficult but “assumed” shots, even when the system hasn’t created a clear advantage.
And where do the Suns stand in this season of change?
With a score of 0.17, Phoenix currently sits at 13th this season. But since we’re in the era of advanced data, we can break this stat down into several components: three‑pointers, midrange, paint, play context, assisted or not. From three, the Suns remain in their usual range (13th) with contexts where they’re more efficient than others: 76th percentile on catch‑and‑shoot, and on the opposite end, only the 17th percentile on pull‑ups.
The Suns’ midrange score is sharply down compared to last season, when they ranked first at 0.94. This year, they’ve dropped to 10th (0.17). In the paint, it’s the opposite trend, but still not great (from 25th to 18th). I’ll probably talk about it next year, but their paint game also has a huge margin for improvement, both on good and bad shots. On finishes like floaters, the team is in the negative, which is explainable by the departures of Durant, Beal, and Nurkic, and by the evolution of the game. But the Suns have gone from 0.47 to -0.06.
This negative trend also appears in transition. Phoenix wasn’t exceptional last year (12th), but now it’s even worse: we’re second‑to‑last at -0.17. In the halfcourt, they’ve dropped 8 spots compared to last season, when they ranked first, again explained by player departures and changes in both team style and league style.
Finally, to wrap up this heavy section, Phoenix also sees a drop in shot‑making on assisted and non‑assisted shots: 12th in assisted shot‑making and 16th in self‑created shot‑making (4th and 2nd last year).
Individually, it’s not too bad in some categories. Devin Booker and Dillon Brooks are both in the 95th percentile in midrange, Royce O’Neale and Collin Gillespie are above the 90th percentile from three, and those four (along with Grayson Allen) are the only ones above the 80th percentile in overall shot‑making. The team no longer relies on this type of shot, but still has alternatives beyond our lone franchise player when needed late in the clock.
In the end, this season doesn’t just tell the story of Phoenix’s decline in shot‑making. It tells the story of a change in nature. The Suns are no longer the team that lived off individual exploits, nor the one that could hide its structural flaws behind a contested Durant pull‑up or a Booker fadeaway. They’re learning to play differently, to create differently, to exist differently.
