We are eight games into the Brian Schottenheimer era, nearly halfway through the season, and so far there is a lot to like about the 10th head coach of America’s Team.
Even after a miserable performance
against the Broncos, the offense – for which Schottenheimer calls plays – has been stellar. They’re second in both yards and points and rank fifth in EPA/play and eighth in offensive DVOA. Dak Prescott is having arguably the best year of his illustrious career, and Javonte Williams is enjoying a career resurgence.
The defense hasn’t been as good, to say the least, but they’ve seen improvements. Over the last four weeks, they’re actually up to 20th in EPA/play and 15th in EPA/dropback, both of which are legitimate jumps in efficiency. Matt Eberflus has drastically shifted his scheme the last two weeks, increasing press coverage by over 20%, blitz rate by 24%, and tripling his rates of both Cover 1 and Cover 0.
Schottenheimer undoubtedly played a part, small or large, in making those schematic adjustments to better fit the players Eberflus is working with. He’s also remained steady in the precise, methodical way he calls this offense, routinely setting his players up for success despite not having CeeDee Lamb for a chunk of those games.
Yet, there is still one glaring area where Schottenheimer is failing the Cowboys: aggression.
That might seem odd to say, given the way Schottenheimer’s offense frequently attacks down the field, but I’m talking about his approach to fourth downs. Schottenheimer’s predecessor, Mike McCarthy, was one of the more aggressive head coaches in the league when it came to fourth-down decision-making. Thus far, Schottenheimer has not followed suit.
So far this season, the Cowboys have gone for it on fourth down just nine times. Only nine teams have fewer fourth-down attempts, but it isn’t just a lack of attempts. Schottenheimer hasn’t been going for it when he should go for it.
According to rbsdm.com, which uses a fourth-down model similar to what many NFL teams use, Dallas has gone for it on roughly 25% of the fourth downs they should be going for it. Specifically, this model accounts for plays where a successful conversion would yield at least a 1% win probability increase; for context, the average first down carries about a 0.4% win probability increase.
Schottenheimer’s ~25% optimal go rate is one of the lowest in the league, with only the Steelers and Titans having a lower rate. The Lions and Eagles, both of whom are doing pretty well so far this season, lead the league with an 86% optimal go rate. Almost two thirds of the league is over 50%, too, hammering home just how far behind the rest of the NFL Schottenheimer has been.
McCarthy had always been a risk-taker as a coach, but he made it a point in Dallas especially, building out the team’s analytics department over time. Now led by John Park, the Cowboys have one of the largest analytics departments in the league, and they were tied for eighth in optimal go rate over McCarthy’s five years with the team. The Cowboys also had a 51.6% conversion rate during that stretch.
Despite McCarthy’s success on fourth downs, Schottenheimer has shied away from that aggressiveness, and it’s cost the Cowboys.
In Week 1 against the Eagles, Schottenheimer opted for a field goal in the second quarter. Brandon Aubrey drilled it, but the Cowboys lost 4.2% win probability. Against the Bears, a similar decision for a field goal cost them 2.6% win probability. In the Panthers game, there were two different fourth quarter decisions – a field goal and a punt – that cost Dallas a net 17.7% win probability.
The latest loss to the Broncos offered yet another moment.
In the third quarter, Dallas was trailing 30-17. Their offense had scored a touchdown on the opening drive of the quarter, and the defense held the Broncos to a field goal. A touchdown on the ensuing drive would have cut the deficit to just six and completely altered the trajectory of the game.
A pass on third down with six yards to go at the Dallas 44 was unsuccessful. There were three and a half minutes left in the third quarter, and time was ticking away. Most teams would go for it there, and the models suggested as much. Dallas stood to gain nearly seven full percentage points of win probability with a successful conversion.
Schottenheimer punted, and was almost immediately roasted for it on social media.
Obviously, there are a lot of if’s going into that scenario, but the entire mindset behind being aggressive on fourth downs is to give your team a competitive advantage. Teams that are more likely to go for it on fourth down – like the Lions and Eagles – can get more creative with their play-calling knowing they have an extra down to play with if things don’t work out.
For a team with as much working against them as the Cowboys have right now, giving yourself that kind of competitive advantage can be the difference between a win and a loss. And as we pointed out above, it has been exactly the difference in all of their losses so far this year.
Schottenheimer has gotten a lot right in his first year on the job, but as he transitions into the second half of the schedule – and with a bye coming up soon – his approach to fourth downs is one major area for self-reflection and improvement.
