Often, the biggest problem with complex statistics is that there is not a good enough frame of reference. I always try to include league average references for the new metrics that we come up with, but league average is not the only frame of reference available. For many Astros fans, they want to know why the Astros offense is worse than previous offenses and league average data really doesn’t impact that. Furthermore, going back in time will allow us to test secondary average and real offensive
value to see if it is strongly correlated with runs scored.
In order to do that, we are looking at the Astros statistics for 2015 through 2025 while excluding 2020. We are doing that because they only played 60 games, so the runs scored column won’t tell us much on its own. It is always important to be upfront about our limitations. We are not looking at league norms for these statistics. Some seasons see more run scoring overall than others. We are simply looking at just the Astros to see overall team trends and to put the 2025 numbers into a much larger context.
Secondary average = Total bases + walks + stolen bases – hits – caught stealing / at bats
Real offensive value = Batting average + Secondary average / 2
Before we look at the 2025 numbers specifically, let’s look at how these numbers shake out in terms of establishing a correlation. One of the cardinal rules of social science is that you can never attribute causation to any number. ROV does not cause run scoring or vice versa. What we are looking for is whether it is correlated with it. We don’t even need a table for that.
- 2019: 1st in runs, 1st in ROV
- 2017: 2nd in runs, 2nd in ROV
- 2021: 3rd in runs, 3rd in ROV
- 2023: 4th in runs, 4th in ROV
- 2018: 5th in runs, 5th in ROV
- 2024: 6th in runs, 9th in ROV
- 2022: 7th in runs, 6th in ROV
- 2015: 8th in runs, 7th in ROV
- 2016: 9th in runs, 8th in ROV
- 2025: 10th in runs, 10th in ROV
It isn’t a perfect correlation. Very few things are ever a perfect correlation. However, we can see that it is pretty strong comparing run scoring and real offensive value. Still, these are high minded numbers that are apt to confuse some readers. If we break it down to its basic components we can see that the 2025 squad was last amongst the ten teams with a .248 secondary average. The 2024 squad was ninth with a .256 secondary average. So, recent history would seem to indicate that the Astros offense is getting worse.
If we break this down even further then we see that the 2025 had the fewest total bases of any Astros team since 2015, only surpassed the 2024 bunch in walks, and finished with the sixth most stolen bases in the period. When you remove power, patience, and speed then you remove all of secondary average. I should point out that the big league average for secondary average in 2025 was .268. The big league average for batting average was .245.
These numbers are important because it shows that the Astros were better than the league average in batting average, but scored fewer runs than average. That is because their secondary average lagged well behind the league average. The big league average real offensive value was .257. That tells you where the Astros are in terms of overall run production.
Ok, now what?
One of the things we teach our students is that they should end all of their persuasive essays with a “call to action.” In other words, you’ve convinced me, now what? This is where we get back into the performance scouting from the piece on Monday. If you want a team that draws more walks and hit for more power then you employ a team that draws more walks and hits for more power. That is easier said than done, but the Astros have some limited options to boost their power and patience.
The most telling solution comes in how they employ their younger players. The combination of Zach Cole and Brice Matthews offer a ton of swing and miss and that usually results in lower batting averages. However, they both have intriguing power and speed possibilities. Obviously, minor league performance is not necessarily a predictor of big league performance, but both players saw walk rates well above ten percent throughout the minors.
You can also chew around the edges some when it comes to who you fill the end of your roster with. The Astros are still looking for a backup catcher and these numbers should be a large part of the conversation. Most of this will come in how Joe Espada marshals his resources. It is the job of the hitting coaches to get the most out of each individual hitter that they can, but Espada fills out the lineup card and decides who hits where. It’s not going to make a huge impact one way or the other, but even 50 runs either way could make the difference between a playoff berth and not.
However, the other part is on us as fans. The 2019 Astros are not walking through that door. George Springer is not coming in. The 2019 versions of Altuve, Correa, and Yordan aren’t either. We will have to manage expectations and we should expect that this dynasty is either at an end or in a period of awkward transition. Espada has a harder job in some cases than A.J. Hinch ever had. We need to proceed accordingly and remember to temper our expectations.
