The general rule of thumb I have always heard when it comes to evaluating MLB general managers is that you should give them five years before you make any firm decisions. Picollo is now entering his fifth offseason, and his team has reached the playoffs once, finished over .500 twice, and finished with 90+ losses twice. If we were to evaluate only on record, this fifth season would seem to be a tipping point for a GM who has had one season where the team greatly outperformed expectations, another
where they pretty badly underperformed expectations, and a pair of seasons where they were pretty close to expectations. Can he get one more overperformance? Or will he be searching for a new job this time next year?
While perhaps it makes little sense to spend a lot of time evaluating the four drafts the team has overseen since Picollo took charge – those also take a long time to truly shake out – it does seem worth noting that the Royals at least got Jac Caglianone from the 2024 draft, with David Shields and L.P. Langevin making waves and earning organizational awards. The 2025 draft also has an award winner in Josh Hammond, while Nolan Sailors and Kamden Edge have flashed. Justin Lamkin was looking really good before an injury shortened his AA season, and now he will pitch in the AFL against some of the best prospects in baseball. This year’s first-overall draftee, Zion Rose, has already debuted in A+. He and this year’s big international signing, Angeibel Gomez, will join Lamkin in the AFL.
That leaves the 2023 draft as a real dud. Blake Mitchell had a decent minor league season, but no one else from that draft has shown much to get excited about. I’m willing to forgive Picollo for that, because it might have just taken that long to get his preferred people and systems into place. Regardless, the drafting and international signings appear to have been overall positives for KC since Picollo took the reins.
With that shallow evaluation completed, I wanted to dig a fair bit deeper into his major league free agent signings and trades. You could argue that the players he has allowed to leave, non-tendered, or signed to minor league deals are nearly as important, but I think the thought processes that go into those kinds of decisions can be quite a bit more nebulous. Whereas, with MLB FA signings, it comes down to definitely wanting that guy to be on your team for sure, and trades show a desire to improve one area and a willingness to sacrifice another.
I have listed out all the MLB signings since Picollo took over, as well as all of the trades, plus extensions that added time to a player’s contract. The idea is to go through and evaluate each trade as a win, loss, or wash.
My methodology for trades will be thus: If the Royals have gotten good play from the player(s) they acquired, that’s a win regardless of what they gave up. If the Royals have not gotten good play, but the guy they traded hasn’t been particularly good either, that’s a neutral result. And if the Royals traded away someone they wish they had now and got someone who hasn’t really helped, that’s a loss.
I will be evaluating signings based on whether the player was a reasonable value for the money spent, with a starting point (though not an ending point) of 1 WAR being roughly equivalent to $8 million.
The goal is to get to the end, count the wins, losses, and ties, and hopefully have a better idea of whether Picollo is more often successful for the value given up when acquiring players or more often unsuccessful. This will then, ideally, allow us to state with some level of certainty whether Picollo has been hampered by an inability to acquire good players or if he simply hasn’t had the resources (money and inherited prospects) to put together a better team. This should give us some idea of whether to have much hope for next season.
If the results of this exercise do not appear particularly clear-cut, I may do this exercise again with another GM (or, baseball gods help me, two) who is generally considered to have been good at his job over the last 3+ years. Off the top of my head, I’m thinking Chris Getz’s White Sox could be a good example. Matt Arnold’s Brewers might be even better. I’m open to suggestions here, so feel free to drop your thoughts in the comments below.
We are very specifically not evaluating whether any of these deals made sense when they were done. Nor whether Matt Quatraro used them as best he could. Those are mostly irrelevant to whether Picollo actually got the job done. It’s a bit like the distinction between a barrelled ball that was an out, except in reverse because when evaluating on this scale, the results matter as much or more than the process. If you have a perfect process for four years but no results, you still gotta change something.
Without further ado, let’s begin the evaluation.
2023
Signed Aroldis Chapman
Setting aside the moral issues, Chapman was worth 1.3 fWAR in 29.1 innings even before the Royals traded him, so I don’t even have to cheese my gimmick to make this one an absolute win for the $3.9 million the Royals paid him.
1-0-0
Signed Ryan Yarbrough
The Royals gave Ryan $3 million. He was worth 0.7 fWAR before he was traded. Which means he was worth double his contract, the Royals didn’t even pay it all, and they got trade him later.
2-0-0
Signed Jordan Lyles
Lyles was given $17 million for two years. He was bad the first year and barely pitched the second year. This was a deal that always looked questionable, and it didn’t age well.
2-1-0
Signed Zack Greinke
Greinke got $8.5 million when Picollo signed him back. Unfortunately, he was significantly worse in his final season. He earned 1.1 fWAR, so I guess that means the Royals broke even on the deal, but boy, it didn’t feel like it. Still, someone had to pitch the innings and he didn’t otherwise hurt the team or preclude other pitchers from developing.
3-1-0
Traded Michael A Taylor for Evan Sisk and Steven Cruz
I’ll warn you now, it’s nearly impossible to lose a trade when the team is in a non-competitive year. Even so, while Sisk likewise didn’t contribute to the club, Cruz has proven to be at least a useful middle relief piece. So that’s a win.
4-1-0
Traded Adalberto Mondesi for Josh Taylor
Taylor was replacement level for the Royals and Mondesi never played in the bigs again. This one is a wash.
4-1-1
Traded Junior Marin for James McArthur
Marin never made it out of the Complex Leagues. McArthur has been worth 0.6 fWAR for the Royals and might yet provide more value if he sticks around. Still, I’ll try to play things a bit conservatively, and we’ll call it a wash leaning towards a win.
4-1-2
Traded Aroldis Chapman for Cole Ragans and Roni Cabrera
It doesn’t matter if Ragans never throws another pitch for KC and Cabrera doesn’t get to the big leagues; this was a win for the Royals all day based on what Ragans did in 2024 alone.
5-1-2
Traded Jose Cuas for Nelson Velázquez
Cuas was bad for everyone he pitched for in between Royals stints. Velázquez was very good for half a season and quite bad for half a season. It’s a wash.
5-1-3
Traded Ryan Yarbrough for Derlin Figueroa and Devin Mann
The Royals didn’t miss Yarbrough for the rest of the season. Unfortunately, Mann is out of affiliated ball, and while Derlin Figueroa had a hot start as a 22-year-old in A+ this season, it didn’t end well. So we’ll call it a wash – but it could still be a win someday.
5-1-4
Traded Scott Barlow for Henry Williams and Jesus Rios
Rios is out of the org; Henry Williams has pitched poorly. Barlow pitched better for the Padres, but he couldn’t have helped the Royals anyway.
2023 Total: 5-1-5
2024
Signed Garrett Hampson
The Royals gave Garrett Hampson $2 million and got half a win from him. We wanted more from him, especially as he ended up involved in 113 games throughout the course of the season. By pure WAR per dollar, it would be a win, but the Royals needed him to be an elite runner and adequate defensive replacement. He wasn’t really those things.
0-0-1
Signed Will Smith
Will Smith was worth -0.3 fWAR. That makes this a loss no matter how much they paid him, but they gave him $5 million. Ouch.
0-1-1
Signed Chris Stratton
Same as above, but Stratton got $8 million. And a second year. Double ouch.
0-2-1
Signed Seth Lugo
We’ll get into the extension later, but the initial deal worked out amazingly well for the Royals. There is no one on earth who can claim to have believed he could finish second in Cy Young voting in 2024 after the Royals signed him.
1-2-1
Signed Michael Wacha
Wacha might not have gotten Cy Young votes, but he was still worth every penny the Royals paid him in 2024.
2-2-1
Signed Hunter Renfroe
The Royals gave Renfroe $12 million for two seasons, a pretty reasonable salary if he’d been a positive contributor at all. He was worth a total of -0.8 fWAR, so he wasn’t. It’s worth noting that he didn’t hurt the team in his first season, but that player option really hurt the team.
2-3-1
Signed Adam Frazier
-0.5 fWAR in 2024. Nope.
2-4-1
Traded Taylor Clarke for Ryan Brady and Cam Devanney
Clarke didn’t pitch in the big leagues in 2024, so the Royals didn’t lose anything on this trade. Brady is a minor league free agent; Devanney went to Japan and was awful. It’s good that Clarke didn’t contribute because…woof.
2-4-2
Traded David Sandlin for John Schreiber
If you evaluate this just by 2024, this is a clear-cut win. It gets a bit murkier if you add in the final two years of Schreiber’s time with Kansas City, but Sandlin hasn’t been much and there’s no guarantee he’ll ever be more. Schreiber was a key reliever for one season and an almost-competent one for two others. Sandlin may end up providing more value during his rookie contract than Schreiber did in his time playing for KC, but the criteria wasn’t that the player(s) acquired be worth more than the one(s) given up, but that they were successful in Kansas City. Schreiber was successful enough.
3-4-2
Traded Cayden Wallace for Hunter Harvey
Wallace was tearing up AA for Washington this season and did well enough in AAA that he is looking like a potentially good player. Harvey barely pitched for Kansas City. I’m afraid I have to count this as a loss.
3-5-2
Traded Walter Pennington for Michael Lorenzen
Pennington hasn’t pitched in the bigs since 2024. Michael Lorenzen was a key piece of the 2024 team down the stretch.
4-5-2
Traded Will Klein, Mason Barnett, and Jared Dickey for Lucas Erceg
This one is rough. On the one hand, Erceg was lights out in 2024, successful with flaws in 2025, and a tire fire in 2026. Dickey stopped hitting after he left the Royals organization; Will Klein didn’t stick in Oakland but has found a home as a useful middle reliever in Los Angeles; and Mason Barnett has a 6.97 ERA as a big league pitcher. The Royals probably miss Klein right now, but they needed Erceg in 2024. He looked good enough at the end of this year that I’m willing to believe he’ll be at least as good as Klein next year. I’m going to call it a controversial win for the Royals.
5-5-2
Traded Jarold Rosado for Paul DeJong
Rosado struggled badly after getting promoted to AA this year at age 23. DeJong wasn’t worth much to the Royals, but I can’t say they really miss Rosado. We’ll call it a draw.
2024 total: 5-5-3
Two-year total: 10-6-8
2025
Signed Michael Wacha again
Wacha has been worth 6.3 fWAR since signing back with KC. The WAR value of $51 million is 6.4. I think we can give J.J. the win on this one.
1-0-0
Signed Michael Lorenzen again
The Royals gave him $7 million, including the buyout, for 1.4 fWAR. Another win.
2-0-0
Signed Carlos Estévez
The Royals gave him $22.2 million, and he provided 0.9 fWAR. He was a win after the first year of the deal, but he accrued -0.3 fWAR this season in a single appearance. I’m afraid we have to call this a loss. That’s the third time J. J. would have done OK if he hadn’t given an extra year.
2-1-0
Traded Brady Singer for Jonathan India and Joey Wiemer
The Royals didn’t miss Singer this year, but they missed him a lot last year. Meanwhile, India was below replacement level. We can argue all day about whether the process of the trade made sense (I think it did). But the results weren’t there.
2-2-0
Traded Cam Devanney for Adam Frazier
We already discussed how Devanney has been doing; Frazier was really good in his second tour with KC.
3-2-0
Traded Andrew Hoffmann for Randal Grichuk
Grichuk didn’t add anything to the Royals. Fortunately for Picollo, Hoffmann has an ERA over 7.00 since being traded to the Diamondbacks.
3-2-1
Traded Evan Sisk and Callan Moss for Bailey Falter
Sisk hasn’t been great, but he’s been pitchable – something that couldn’t be said for either Falter or the Royals’ 2026 bullpen. Callan Moss doesn’t look like he’s going to develop, but it doesn’t matter.
3-3-1
Traded Freddy Fermin for Stephen Kolek and Ryan Bergert
This trade was so good for the Royals that I almost want to give it two wins. Getting either of those pitchers for Fermin would have been a steal. Getting both is one of the most lopsided trades any team has consummated over the past few seasons.
4-3-1
Traded Yunior Marte for Mike Yastrzemski
Yaz was great for KC; Yunior has been nothing useful in the bigs.
5-3-1
Extended Seth Lugo
Rather than trade the veteran, the Royals doubled down with him. Up until that point, Lugo had a 2.95 ERA in 2025 and had, as noted earlier, been runner-up for the Cy Young Award in 2024. Since this extension was inked, he has a 5.69 ERA. You could try to argue that the process made sense, though I’m not sure I’d join you on that. Regardless, it didn’t work out.
Given the way Lugo finished the 2025 campaign, he very possibly could have opted into his player option after all. The Royals could have paid him less this season and been able to walk away after the repeat performance. Instead, they paid the premium, they’re on the hook for 2027, and they need to navigate around his innings totals to prevent his club option from vesting and forcing them to pay him in 2028, too.
For those of you keeping score at home, that’s the fourth time Picollo hung on to a vet too long.
2025 Total: 5-4-1
Three-Year Total: 15-10-9
2026
Extended Maikel Garcia
Maikel was hurt this year, so he didn’t play much or particularly well. But FanGraphs still has him at 1.8 fWAR, and he was paid $4.2 million for this one. I expect him to rebound next year. It’s a win.
1-0-0
Extended Salvador Perez
This one is kind of interesting because the extension basically took his existing team option and spread it over two years in terms of true value because of all the deferrals. (See, teams other than the Dodgers can do that, too!) That means it’s tempting to say the extension is a win because, depending on how you look at it, they either paid him less for this season or got a second season for free. But Salvy was -1.1 fWAR and could easily make that number go further down next year, which means the Royals would have been better off paying him the full amount this year and moving on. Or just declining the player option. I know that would have upset a lot of people who wanted to see Salvy break the franchise home run record, so maybe Picollo was trapped here. But the raw numbers say this was a poor choice.
You could argue this was the fifth time Picollo hung on to someone past the expiration date of their career.
1-1-0
Signed Alex Lange
At a lower cost, he had the same value as Salvy; since that value was negative, it’s still bad.
1-2-0
Signed Lane Thomas
0.8 fWAR for something less than $5.25 million and accomplished what the team needed from him (hitting lefties) at a level commensurate with what could have reasonably been expected. That’s a win.
2-2-0
Signed Starling Marte
Even $1 million is too much to pay for -0.5 fWAR.
2-3-0
Signed Craig Kimbrel
The Royals paid him the prorated amount of the major league minimum for his time in KC, he gave them 0.1 fWAR, and he helped stabilize a bullpen that was in freefall. It’s the tiniest of wins, but a win.
3-3-0
Traded Matthew Hoskins for Kam Misner
Hoskins put up a mediocre ERA in the ACL as a 22-year-old. Misner contributed nothing to the Royals. It’s a wash.
3-3-1
Traded Logan Martin for Mason Black
Martin lost his ability to control his pitches this year; Black was worth -0.5 fWAR. No value gained for either side.
3-3-2
Traded Angel Zerpa for Nick Mears and Isaac Collins
Zerpa was terrible for the Brewers before he got hurt; Mears and Collins combined for 0.1 fWAR.
3-3-3
Traded Jonathan Bowlan for Matt Strahm
This one still hurts because I still think it made all the sense in the world. Also, Strahm was a perfectly adequate pitcher before he got hurt, and I don’t think he ever got healthy. But Picollo was in charge of the training staff that oversaw that disaster, too.
3-4-3
Traded A.J. Causey for Mitch Spence
Spence was bad, but Causey does not appear to be progressing.
3-4-4
Traded Denis Samudio for Connor Seabold
Seabold was bad; Samudio gets strikeouts but lacks control in A-Ball.
3-4-5
Traded cash for Randy Dobnak
Dobnak was better than he had any right to be. Dobnak Time may or may not be completely finished, but this was a stellar trade result, regardless.
4-4-5
Traded Max Martin for Nate Pearson
I’ve said basically the same thing so many times. You give up nothing, you get nothing. Still, Pearson was slightly more than nothing, and I’d rather have him for 2027 than Martin.
5-4-5
Traded Lane Thomas and Bailey Falter for Lucas Braun and Carter Holton
This can only be a wash at worst because Lane Thomas couldn’t do anything positive for the Royals by the time they traded him. Picollo is lucky we aren’t grading the processes here because tacking Falter onto this deal almost certainly lowered the value he got in return. Braun started getting strikeouts when he got to Omaha, but also started giving up line drives and runs. Holton does not appear to have pitched in affiliated ball after being acquired by KC. Sure seems like Moore should have been able to get more for someone who was one of the most coveted types of player available at the deadline.
5-4-6
Traded Kris Bubic for Carlos Duran
Would I rather have Bubic than Duran for 2027? Yes. But the Royals can still have Bubic in 2027 if they want; he’s a free agent.
5-4-7
Traded Manuel Colon for Nolan Hoffman
Hoffman actually showed a little something for the Royals.
6-4-7
Claimed Matthew Lugo
I don’t see it for this Lugo, either.
6-4-8
Claimed Connor Thomas
Thomas showed as much or more than Hoffman at a lower cost
7-4-8
Claimed Spencer Bivens
The Royals might have something in Bivens, but they don’t yet.
7-4-9
Claimed Luke Little
The not-so-little Little spends very little time in the strike zone.
2026 total: 7-4-10
Picollo’s total: 22-14-19
Well, that total isn’t as definitive as I would have liked, but it seems to me that Picollo has actually done pretty well with the deals he’s made, even within the moderately strict analysis I performed. In a total of 55 transactions, he screwed up something less than a third of the time. I am leaning towards believing that this shows his limitations are not his own abilities or the abilities of the front office he has assembled, but rather the resources he has had available to him.
I did see a concerning pattern develop as I went through the exercise, unfortunately, where Picollo has given players an extra year or signed them to extensions to keep them in Kansas City longer than they’re good to keep around. You could argue in the case of Stratton and Renfroe that the team was paying a premium for having been so bad just to get the guys in the door. But that’s not the case with re-signing Lugo or adding an extra year to Salvy. It’s hard to know if the Royals would have been able to get Estévez without the second year; it’s easy to believe they were actually bidding against someone for his services. And I’d be happy to cut him some slack on that if it wasn’t part of the pattern. India’s final arbitration year getting picked up wasn’t evaluated above because, as I said earlier, the reasons for doing that can be a bit nebulous. But it would seem to go into this pattern as well, even if we disregarded how poorly India played before that.
Still, signing Lane Thomas for $5 million is smart baseball. Sure, it would be better for the team to sign a Kyle Schwarber or Cody Bellinger, but Sherman can’t or won’t give him the money to do that. You’d like to see more trades that worked out for the Royals, but they also have only three times in four years given up a player who has contributed positively at the big league level at a time when the Royals could have benefited from it in a trade. And two of those trades still seem to have favored the Royals.
Picollo inherited a farm system bereft of talent and an owner who was unable or unwilling to outlay for a truly impactful free agent after the team added Seth Lugo and Michael Wacha (at mid-low tier SP prices, no less). I’m not going to stand here and tell you he’s the Stephen Hawking of MLB front offices, but it looks to me like he’s doing at least as much as could be expected from a GM in his position. No GM is going to get every move right, and every GM must work within the constraints of his team’s ownership.
That said, I think I’m willing to do this one more time (it’s hugely time-consuming; I don’t think I have it in me to do it more than that without getting paid a lot more than I currently get). So let me know in the comments which GM you’d like me to compare him to, and we’ll see what there is to see.
