At the 5:28 mark of the first quarter of the Golden State Warriors’ 121-113 loss to the Orlando Magic, Steve Kerr simultaneously substituted Jimmy Butler, Draymond Green, and Moses Moody. In their place
were Al Horford, Gary Payton II, and Buddy Hield — collectively, a much smaller group than the trio they replaced. With Brandin Podziemski coming in earlier for Will Richard, Kerr was effectively running a four-guard lineup (Steph Curry, Podziemski, Hield, and Payton) with a center (Horford), which was a risky proposition against a Magic team that profiles as one of the league’s lengthiest and tallest teams.
This particular lineup played only a fraction of the game — 2:23 in total — but were outscored by a total of five points (four points scored to nine given up). In just its first offensive and defensive possessions of the game, it was clear why this lineup would have a difficult time against its counterparts at the time, one that employed Tristan da Silva (6’8”), Franz Wagner (6’10”), and Goga Bitadze (6’11”) as its three-man frontcourt:
A combination of trying to find a consistent stream of offense against a lengthy defense and having to run back to set your own defense is a tough proposition. Virtually not being able to dictate things on defense allows a lineup that is much bigger across the board to have their way through a variety of means, such as offensive boards, putbacks, and paint points.
Furthermore, when both Horford and Hield are involved in defending ball-screen action up top, see if you can find the problem — which, in my view, is two-fold:
Once the Warriors went to a small lineup (small other than Horford, who, at the end of the day, is technically an undersized 6’9” center), the Magic simply involved Horford in direct action — drawing the Warriors’ sole rim protector away from the rim, exacerbated by Horford choosing to step up to the level of the screen against Wagner, who shoots a measly 29.1% on pull-up threes this season. One would think that having a shooting profile such as that would command a deep-drop coverage instead of a high step-up, if only to keep Horford closer to the rim.
That was one fold of the two-fold problem aforementioned; the other fold: the Warriors’ backline defense behind the ball-screen action is simply too small, which is intertwined with the first fold:
With Bitadze released on the short roll due to Horford stepping up, it compels the rest of the defense to help off and pinch in toward the paint, instead of being allowed to stay home if Horford had chosen to play deep-drop coverage. While the Warriors typically aren’t too worried about shooting by the likes of Anthony Black (in the right corner) and Jalen Suggs (in the left wing), what they give up instead is da Silva cutting along the baseline, behind the much smaller Curry, and making himself available for the lob pass by Bitadze:
Thus, in one possession, the Warriors display the inherent problem that this particular four-guard lineup faced against the Magic, in that it probably wasn’t a prudent decision to play a four-guard lineup against a team whose size is supplemented by plenty of athleticism and speed. While only 2 minutes and 23 seconds of this configuration saw time on the floor, it was probably 2 minutes and 23 seconds too many on this particular night. By the time it was abandoned by Kerr, the Warriors went from a one-point lead to a four-point deficit.
(In order to rectify that lineup gaffe, Kerr pivoted to a double-big lineup anchored by Horford and Quinten Post as his first substitution stint of the second half. The duo was a plus-four in 4 minutes and 36 seconds of floor time, mostly courtesy of the offensive boost it provided. However, by the time it was deployed it was simply a matter of too little, too late.)
Another key lineup decision that arguably cost the Warriors against the Magic: the decision to go with Hield during a crucial stretch of the game, during which the Warriors had trimmed the deficit to five. A botched switch by Hield gives Anthony Black a clear lane to the rim:
If not for his shooting, Hield’s value on the floor banks on his ability to space the floor and create wide lanes for the likes of Curry and Butler, while also finishing advantages created by the Warriors’ two main offensive engines. Hield just hasn’t been able to finish advantages nor create wide lanes; more importantly, he has the billing of a shooter who simply just hasn’t been able to shoot, averaging just 31.6% from beyond the arc on 7.4 attempts per 75 possessions. In his 15 minutes against the Magic, he attempted only three shots (with one made), turned the ball over on a head-scratching decision, and was a minus-five. On the season, the Warriors have been outscored by a whopping 51 points in Hield’s 267 minutes, a team worst. Hield’s consistently inconsistent nature has been a microcosm of Warriors players not named Curry, Butler, and to a certain extent, Draymond Green — that is, that they haven’t been consistent enough to fill in the gaps, as they weren’t good enough to supplement a combined 76-point night from the Warriors’ core three.
Granted, many more problems plagued the Warriors tonight other than just a sliver of four-guard lineup minutes and Hield minutes (although, it was a damaging sliver of minutes). To no one’s absolute surprise, turnovers were the (often-self-inflicted) bane of their existence. The Magic converted the Warriors’ 18 turnovers into 21 points off of turnovers. On the season, the Warriors turn the ball over on 16.5% of their offensive possessions, fourth worst in the league.
With the veterans (core three included) most likely sitting out tomorrow’s back end of the back-to-back slate against the Miami Heat, the Warriors once again failed to capitalize on an opportunity to create cushion, as they failed to do against an injury-ridden Indiana Pacers team and a Giannis-Antetokounmpo-less Milwaukee Bucks team.
