One of the things we want to do in the lab is to find as many different ways to explain what we are seeing as possible. The Houston Astros were 21st in the league in runs scored. They were 11th in team batting average. Therefore, something is going on that would limit their offensive production. At this point, people will point the finger at things like clutch hitting and other factors. Our goal here is to explain things in a more systemic way. I have introduced bases per out for all of our players
and that can explain a lot of things, but our goal is to come up with as many ways to explain what we are seeing as possible.
That will involve some existing metrics that we have not looked at yet. The chief among these is a number called secondary average. Secondary average is calculated by taking total bases, walks, and stolen bases and then subtracting hits and then dividing it by at bats. In other words, we are adding isolated power, isolated patience, and stolen bases together. The beauty is secondary average is that it is interpreted the same way as batting average.
A .250 secondary average is right around league average depending on the season. A .300 secondary average would be good and a .200 secondary average is bad. Unfortunately, secondary average does not explain everything. Batting average still explains quite a bit and the Astros are better than most teams at hitting for average. So, I am introducing a new metric that I am calling “real offensive value”. It is calculated by taking the average of batting average and secondary average. It is also interpreted the same way as batting average.
The last number is what Fangraphs calls “Oswing”. It calculates the percentage of pitches outside of the strike zone a hitter swings at. The league average tends to hover around 30 percent. We are looking at eleven Astros players that will be returning. We are exclusing Victor Caratini since he is not under contract and we are not including Nick Allen because he was not here or Zach Cole and Brice Mathews because neither had 100 plate appearances.
There are two types of data. There is what I would call process data and what I would call performance data. O-Swing is process data. It helps explain why. It helps explain why players have good walk rates or not. It can also explain partially why players may not have tremendous isolated power numbers. When you swing at pitcher’s pitches you can often swing and miss, but some players are talented enough to make contact with those pitches.
Yainer Diaz and Jose Altuve have well above average contact rates. This is especially true given the number of pitches outside the zone that they swing at. However, the quality of the contact is often impacted. So, those players live off of more singles than is typical. That can be seen in secondary average. When players have a secondary average below .200 like Yainer Diaz and Cam Smith then we can see they are living off of singles.
There are two competing forces coinciding here. On the one hand, there is the Albert Einstein definition of insanity. He said insanity was doing the same thing over and over again, but expecting a different result. The lineup is largely unchanged. So, it would seem unwise to expect a different result from the same lineup would be counterproductive. Still, that is only one part of the equation.
The second part of the equation is that past results are no guarantee of future performance. Yordan Alvarez was not healthy last season and most projections have him returning to career norms. Cam Smith is young and most believe he will continue to improve. Jesus Sanchez and Carlos Correa had down seasons according to their career norms. You get the idea. Hope springs eternal.
The truth when we look at the data is that some things change and some things don’t. Players can improve in some areas, but in some areas players tend to be who they are. Jeremy Pena and Jose Altuve aren’t going anywhere and they will always be free swingers. Yet, they do not hold a candle to Diaz in terms of free swinging. The Astros have hired two new hitting coaches, but they are unlikely to coach that out of him. His O-swing numbers have not changed considerably in three years, but how pitchers have responded to him in comparison with his teammates has changed. He sees 46 percent of hit pitches in the strike zone. You’ll notice that Altuve has 46.4 percent of balls in the zone and Pena saw 49.5 percent. The rest of the team saw 50 percent or above.
The dilemma for the Astros is whether they can get the three of them to mute some of those tendencies to improve their overall performance. Altuve was at his best when he was living between 31 and 33 percent swings outside the zone. Some of that is likely age and diminishing of pitch recognition that comes with that. Some of that might be an erosion of the approach that came when he was at his best. The Astros and their fans can hope that a change in approach can recoup some of that.
However, the most effective change is in roster construction. By now, everyone is familiar with the “Moneyball” approach and the movie certainly made that more popular. You’d be forgiven if you thought that it was about on base percentage. That is certainly how it manifested itself, but the core of the Moneyball approach was in what was labeled “performance scouting.” If you want players that walk more you sign and acquire players that walk more. If you want players that won’t chase balls outside the zone you sign and acquire players that don’t swing outside the zone. Believe it or not, Dana Brown is doing some of that. Say what we will about Nick Allen, but he does not chase as much as Mauricio Dubon does.
So, the Astros might not chase as much as a team in 2026 as they did in 2025. That might very well be a function of roster construction more than coaching. The goal for the Astros is to score more runs. The key is not batting average. The key is walks and hitting for more power. That probably involves players that hit for more power and draw more walks. The task for Dana Brown is constructing a roster that will do those things.
