Perhaps all Manchester United really needed was a little KISS. No, not that kind, rather the acronym that stands for Keep It Simple Stupid.
For a season that’s been dominated by talk of formations, tactical
systems, and players who aren’t quite at the level of being able to play this complex system, Michael Carrick decided simpler is better en route to United picking up their biggest win of the year.
Carrick deployed his team in a dynamic 4-2-3-1 shape. Players like Bruno Fernandes and Luke Shaw were restored to their natural positions. Harry Maguire and Lisandro Martinez no longer had to worry about being a middle center back or an outside center back but instead a simple center back partnership. Amad and Patrick Dorgu were deployed on the wings, but were asked to do things very similar to the wing-back roles they’ve been playing all season. The most out of position player was Bryan Mbuemo – deployed in a hybrid striker/false-9 role. He’d previously played up top for Brentford but as a split striker.
The result was a comprehensive 2-0 win that was nowhere near as close as the scoreline suggests. United put the ball in City’s net five times, with three of them being called back for offside – two of which were only marginal. But whereas previous United teams would have flustered by those injustices from VAR, this time they simply put it in the rearview mirror, lined back up, and scored again.
United only had 32 percent of the possession, but were never threatened. City took just seven shots for less than 0.5 xG. At 90 minutes the fourth official could have held up a board that said “+30” and it wouldn’t have mattered, Manchester City were not going to score.
It was such a defeat that with 10 minutes to play Pep Guardiola withdrew his two most dangerous attackers in Erling Haaland and Bernardo Silva. As Sam Lee, The Athletic’s Manchester City beat writer, said, Guardiola’s changes were sending a clear message: “this game cannot be rescued.”
The phrase “tactical masterclass” gets thrown around too liberally these days. It’s often used to describe a match where one teams hold on for dear life but steal a win against an opponent who dominated them on the day. What happened during lunchtime on Saturday was not that. This was a tactical masterclass in the truest sense of the word.
Michael Carrick’s game plan gave the perfect amount of respect to Manchester City. When United lost the ball they hustled back into their 4-4-2 block. They were not going to aggressively press and chase the ball around – this is Manchester City after all. Rather they’d sit off the back line and cut off the passing angles to City’s key players in midfield.
But while this was Manchester City this was also a team that didn’t have any senior center-backs in their squad. Three of the four players on City’s back line sported squad numbers typically reserved for matches in the FA Trophy. They weren’t just young, they were inexperienced, and United were not going to let them settle into the game and get comfortable.
While United weren’t aggressively pressing City, they lied in wait, ready to move as soon as someone was put into a vulnerable position with a heavy touch or a bad pass.
They cut off passing angles and then quickly moved to take away space, forcing turnovers from bad passes.
United created so much discomfort at the back for City, that even Rodri – the man known for always having poise on the ball – created a chance for United with an uncharacteristic mistake right outside his own box.
United were not deploying a high press, nor were they parking the bus. United have deployed similar tactics under both Ruben Amorim and Erik Ten Hag but rarely to such devastating results (there’s the derby in January 2023 and that’s pretty much it – even the 2024 FA Cup final United were outshot 19-11).
Despite having very strong individual players United have struggled defensively for the better part of three seasons. The big reason for that is how often those defenders have found themselves isolated. Under both Amorim and Ten Hag the midfielders had to cover far too much ground, leaving them unable to protect the center backs. Carrick mitigated this by having his team remain very compact. The wingers stayed narrow to help protect the central midfielders. The midfielders were then able to help protect the back four. The key to it all was staying compact. Just take a look at the distance between Harry Maguire and Bryan Mbeumo.
City don’t have any threats to run in behind. By staying vertically compact, United greatly reduced the amount of space City had to play in and thus the amount of space they had to cover. This meant that even when United were conceding space to City, once they broke the first line United were in position to quickly close players down, force turnovers, and quickly launch attacks the other way.
Part of the brilliance of the game plan was Carrick’s ability to use Pep Guardiola’s philosophy against him. City want to play in the middle of the pitch. Thus, United packed the middle of the pitch.
In doing that, United conceded plenty of pace on the outside but that was a happy tradeoff. City aren’t that dangerous from the outside. You may have noticed that time and time again City were making simple passes out wide with Diogo Dalot and Luke Shaw then having to haul ass to get out there.
Here, City go on the break and despite Bernardo Silva making a good wide run, Diogo Dalot stays narrow.
United have been susceptible to crosses all season long. Pep Guardiola doesn’t like his wingers trying to beat their defenders 1v1. They’re certainly not going to take you to the by line and whip in a cross. Therefore United didn’t have to worry about this vulnerability. They knew that City’s wingers want to cut back towards the inside – and if you cut that avenue off from them, they’re simply going to make a safe back pass and recycle possession.
If you’re not worried about having to stop a first-touch cross, it opens up a lot of possibilities as to how you can defend.
Carrick’s side also deployed elements that we have seen work against United this season. The Busby Babe has previously spoken about teams like Everton, West Ham, and Aston Villa ensuring that the “free man” that was created by playing with a back three would end up being the outside center backs. Opponents wanted these players on the ball because these were the players least likely to hurt them.
United deployed similar tactics on Saturday. It wasn’t necessarily about preventing the ball from getting to more dangerous certain spaces but who had the ball in those spaces. When City’s defenders wanted to carry the ball forward, United were more than happy to let them.
Those were the players that couldn’t do much with it and it would often lead to a turnover.
There’s another situation late in the second half. City works the ball over to center back Abdukodir Khusanov. Rather than stepping out to Khusanov, Bruno Ferandes positions himself between the ball and Rodri, cutting off the pass to City’s main possession hub.
With no passing options available, Khusanov decides to carry the ball forward and United just… let him.
Once Khusanov gets to the edge of the box he realizes there’s not much he can do. He turns around and plays a pass back to Semenyo who has essentially now taken up a fullback position.
If Semenyo is going to get on the ball, United would prefer to be deeper and wider. If someone is going to have the ball on the edge of the box, United would rather it be a center back. Getting the wrong person on the ball in the wrong places helps your opponent. United knows all about this.
Tactics matte,r but no matter how good your tactical plan is, it’s not worth anything without the execution of the players. The effort each United player gave was off the charts. The term “wanting it more” is an overused cliche that too often is used to try and blame players for things that aren’t their fault – but when it came to Patrick Dorgu’s goal is really was just a case of wanting it more, as the United left back simply out hustled and out muscled Rico Lewis to get on the end of Mathues Cunha’s cross.
More than the effort of the players, what really stood out from this performance was how much the players trusted each other to do their jobs. Players weren’t lunging into tackles as they felt they needed to win the ball back. Rather they stood their ground and kept the play in front of them knowing their teammates would collapse from another angle to make the play.
Here Haaland gets the ball in space but watch how no one steps out towards Halaand. They let him run towards the box while Maguire, Martinez, and Dalot, slowly come together and cut off space. When he tries to make a pass, Luke Shaw is getting back to break it up, and when United fail to clear, they never switch off and stay with the play.
Casemiro has always been a see-ball, go win ball type of midfielder. For most of his career this was effectively a cheat code because he’d almost always win the ball, but as his legs have gone in recent years, it’s been a tool to drag him out of position. In this situation Rodri finds a huge pocket of space to receive the ball. In the past Casemiro would run towards him to close him down – which is what Rodri wants! Instead Casemiro holds his ground, Rodri runs out of space. When he tries to make a pass Casemiro blocks it and United get the ball back looking to attack.
There were several moments where City would finally work the ball to a dangerous player in a dangerous spot. As a United fan you’d bemoan the defender for even letting a player like Halaand receive a pass, let alone be able to turn on the ball. Yet every time that happened, someone was there.
It was as if the initial defender knew my job is not let him do X, a teammate will be there to prevent Y. Even when United were careless with the ball and turning it over in bad spots, they didn’t lose their heads. They focused on the immediate job, knowing that somewhere in the chain a teammate would be ready to fly in and make a play.
Carrick came in and simplified things for United. There weren’t fancy rotations for the sake of rotations. Midfielders were asked to be midfielders. Fullbacks were asked to do fullback things. When Diogo Dalot made a terrible play on the ball, he did so from the position that a right back should be in!
As frustrating as this pass might be, you’d rather Dalot be the on ball with Amad and Bryan Mbeumo in front of him than Amad be on the ball with the most dangerous pass being to… Dalot.
Though Carrick ultimately simplified a lot of things we shouldn’t lull ourselves into believing the game plan was simple. There were complicated layers to how United went about things. They didn’t just hit the ball forward and try to run on City. They had a deliberate buildup pattern featuring Mbeumo and Bruno dropping into midfield to overload City’s narrow press. They built up on one side of the pitch to open up switches of play to wide open players.
Over the last few years United’s defense has hinged on players winning their 1v1 duels. If someone loses a duel the entire structure breaks down. Out of possession, Carrick opted to simplify as much of the game as he could. United got back to defending as a team. Players didn’t have to worry about standing in the right spot and needing to win a duel. Instead they were able to focus on the job at hand, knowing their teammates were going to be there to support them.
When facing a team like Manchester City, you can’t stop everything. Rather than try, Carrick opted to focus on cutting off the head of the attack, and from there using as much of City’s philosophy against them as possible.
In the age where everyone is after the newest complex tactical model, sometimes the best thing you can do is just keep things simple.
