Oregon runs a Mint Defense. Preventing explosives is a core principle of this scheme. That principle would, in theory, limit a Mint defense’s ability to stop the run in short-yardage situations. Oregon doesn’t
tend to crowd the box or sell out to stop the run.
For the purposes of this analysis, I’ve defined short-yardage situations as the following set of downs:
- 2nd and 4 or fewer
- 3rd and 3 or fewer
- 4th and 1
Hypothesis: The more effective a defense is at stopping short yardage runs, the more susceptible that defense will be to explosive pass plays in the same down and distance situations.
Here’s a comparison of those metrics for all Power 5 conference teams since 2015, excluding the shortened COVID season (2020). On the y-axis, we have the opposing offense’s explosive play percentage on short-yardage passing plays. A lower percentage translates to a better defensive outcome. On the x-axis, we have the defense’s ability to stop the run in short-yardage situations. A higher percentage translates to a better defensive outcome. Unlike how box scores compile stats for college games, sacks don’t count as rushes for this. Notable Mint defenses have been separated from the rest of the set.
If the hypothesis were true, we’d expect to see a positive relationship between these variables. The trend lines would indicate the contrary, however loosely correlated they may be. This doesn’t account for a defense’s quality. I’d expect a good defense to be more likely to excel at both defensive aspects than not. Similarly, I’d expect a bad defense to be bad in both aspects.
To account for that, we can model the two variables against a defense’s FPI rating and SP+ rating. Then the model can be used to output the situational run stop rate and situational explosive pass rate allowed above or below expectation given their defensive ratings. These are called residuals. Below is the same scatter plot with the axes replaced with the associated residuals for both FPI and SP+ ratings. Residuals haven’t been capped at possible values in order to preserve trend behavior.
Wait… Mint defenses still have a negative trend, but the rest of the teams have flipped to a slightly positive relationship. This would seem to indicate that Mint defenses don’t have the tradeoff of allowing more short-yardage conversions in the run game to prevent explosive pass plays, but that other defenses do.
What if we split out Oregon’s four seasons under Dan Lanning and ignore the small sample bias? In order of run stop rate, Oregon’s defenses above are 2024, 2025, 2022, 2023. Oregon’s Mint defenses are positively correlated – Hypothesis correct! Just kidding. For one, none of these charts shows a significant correlation. The trendlines are merely there to tease out what little relationship exists. Without them, it’d be very difficult to identify any relationship between the two variables. In reality, the hypothesis fails because there isn’t a significant relationship between the short-yardage run stop rate and preventing explosive passes.
I also split out Oregon’s Mint defenses when evaluating the residuals. Oregon’s residuals aren’t as negatively correlated as other Mint defenses, but there’s not a significant trend when accounting for a defense’s overall strength. Here are Oregon’s short-yardage situation run stop and explosive pass allowed rates by season since 2015:
The 2025 Oregon defense finished the regular season as Dan Lanning’s most effective unit across both metrics combined in his four years as head coach. Oregon has allowed just one explosive pass play in short-yardage situations this year. Care to guess what play it was?
It was USC’s Biletnikoff Award-winning WR, Makai Lemon, throwing a 24-yard touchdown on 2nd and 1. It took a trick play to get an explosive pass against Oregon in a short-yardage situation. The play was pretty well defended. The throw was just better. Oregon enters the playoffs with this area being a major strength for the defense.
Go Ducks!
