Over the last couple of decades we’ve seen a shift in the playstyle of the NBA. From defensive prowess to ball-handling to superteams to 3-point shooting, a few years can be unforgiving if you’re a player of a particular skillset. Teams come and go from the top and analytics have helped pave the way for what is now being called the “parity era”, where an advantage is hard to come by.
With seven different champions in the last seven years, the recipe for dominance in the NBA is still changing. What
the exact ingredients are still isn’t entirely clear, but it has helped prompt a discussion of what can (probably) be left out soon.
In the offseason, most basketball fans flocked to watch the Americup Qualifiers and Eurobasket, prompting the same observations as every other year: bench NBA players having big performances abroad, highlighting the differences in rules, refereeing, and style of play. Some of my favourite examples of the differences between FIBA and the NBA are Dennis Schroder, Simone Fontecchio, and Bruno Caboclo. Guys whose NBA careers have been underwhelming (or forgettable), while their play representing their countries with lower calibre support has been medal-worthy.
So what is the difference then? Why did Giannis say it was harder to score in Europe than the NBA? While some people might think that was rage bait, he isn’t necessarily wrong. Rule differences in FIBA allow for defence to remain in the paint indefinitely, closing lanes to the basket. Travelling calls. It’s also harder to draw a foul. The combination of those things mean that teamwork and ball movement are a priority. With European players like Luka, Jokic, Wemby, and Giannis dominating the NBA as they showcase those abilities and help contribute to winning teams, the importance has shifted slightly from purely individual player talent and more towards roster construction.
Teams have been trying to use what has worked in the past, recreating the concept of a “big 3” with little success. Take for instance the 2024-2025 Phoenix Suns. Their top 3 guys were all making roughly $50 million per year, leaving the remainder of the roster to collect less than 10 million annually with the exception of Grayson Allen. Of course injuries were a factor, but when the majority of your money is invested in three players, that’s the risk you take. Outcome? Eliminated from the playoffs altogether. The year prior they were healthier but ended up as the 6th seed, swept by the Timberwolves in the first round. They’re not alone in that endeavor either, with the Nets’, (KD, Kyrie, and Harden followed by KD, Kyrie, and Simmons), Sixers’ (Embiid, PG, Maxey), Clippers’ (Kawai, PG, Harden), Suns’ (Durant, Booker, Beal), and Thunder’s (Westbrook, PG, Melo) attempts all coming up empty.
What did they all have in common? All of those teams have, in part, relied on players who play a lot of isolation, who didn’t have the support when those plays failed.
In fairness, isolation has its place. Limiting turnovers on bad passes and taking advantage of switches and mismatches can help players score, but the defenses are also getting better and that’s making things harder for players who rely on it as a primary scoring method. With continued complaints about soft calls and “gimme” free throws, giving the defender the benefit of the doubt will likely become more commonplace as well.
The difference? Isolation can be a component of an offence, but can’t be the go to.
Jayson Tatum relied on isolation for about 26% of his plays. He averaged only 1.01 points per play on that playtype, but helped lead the Celtics to a championship in 2024. Boston’s primary offensive strategy wasn’t isolation though. They capitalized by stocking up on 3-point shooters. That season, they led the league during the regular season and playoffs for most made three-pointers with 16.5 per game, almost 2 more than the next closest team. They attempted more than 42 a game, tied the record for most made by a team with 29, and now hold 4 of the top 10 spots for most threes attempted by a team (3 of 5 if only counting regulation length games). So, the threat of isolation from Tatum opens up opportunities for kickouts when defences collapse, giving teammates wide open opportunities from long range.
Shai utilized isolation at a similar clip, with a quarter of his possessions coming in that form. OKC earned the championship through their defence, long range shooting, and ball movement, with scoring threats coming from all over the floor, not just Shai taking the ball and getting some points.
In the regular season, the Clippers and the Mavericks were the only two teams who used it more than OKC, but with very different results. Dallas didn’t make the playoffs, and the Clippers found themselves eliminated in the first round. Those teams had heavy isolation though, and no support on the roster to make other plays.
Looking across to the other conference, the Pacers utilized isolation at almost half the rate the OKC did, instead using pace, transition, and cutting to score. This strategy led them to the NBA finals, and seems to be creating part of the blueprint for what we’ll see more of in the future. Seemingly because other strategies actually lead to more points.
The Clippers, Mavericks, and Philly are all trying more than 10 possessions per game in isolation, scoring less than a point per possession. Meanwhile, Denver, Golden State, and Cleveland are all averaging a similar number of possessions per game cutting, but earning far more points while doing it (1.38ppp, 1.27ppp, 1.43ppp, respectively).
Teams are seeing the success of ball movement, off-ball movement, cutting and passing as ways to break up tough defences and score. Boston, OKC, and Indiana all had their own way of doing it, but more teams are adopting those strategies as well.
Here’s a perfect example:
Or another one:
For Raptors fans this is good news, because the roster construction and offensive schemes seem to be leaning towards a similar style. Despite injuries, there were shades of it all season with plenty of highlight passing and cutting that was fun to watch. With strong shooters in Gradey and Ja’Kobe, good passers in Scottie, Quickley, and RJ, and defensively minded players in CMB, Ochai, and Shead, it seems like Toronto is going to be a part of the wave of the changing NBA.
A few good scorers won’t be enough. Isolation won’t be enough. The recipe requires 15 guys with chemistry and a lot of unselfish basketball.
