Though much has been said about the non-football context around the hiring of Tottenham Hotspurs’ new head coach Roberto De Zerbi, his support of Mason Greenwood and all that entails is not the only reason to be concerned about the signing of the Italian.
His aggressive and complex brand of football is arguably in line with “the Spurs way”, but with the Lilywhites in freefall down the Premier League table and without a win in over 100 days, relegation is looming ever nearer; and it therefore looks
to be a huge ask for De Zerbi to implement his tactical system given there are but seven matches to go in the season. Spurs need to win as many of those as possible, and the whiplash from Ange Postecoglou to Thomas Frank to Igor Tudor to De Zerbi could result in even more of a lack of tactical identity on the pitch than that which we’ve already seen throughout this campaign.
With that said, let’s dive into how Roberto De Zerbi likes to set up his sides to operate, and how he could apply that to this flailing Tottenham Hotspur side.
Formation
De Zerbi typically prefers some variety of a 4-2-3-1 formation. This can be deployed in different ways, however, depending on opponent or the players he has at his disposal. Sometimes the central attacking role pushes up alongside the striker to produce a 4-2-4; other times that player can drop and one of the double pivot push up to create more of a 4-3-3; and sometimes RDZ opts for a lopsided setup that resembles a back three. It’s the latter De Zerbi often applied to his Marseille side, while with Brighton & Hove Albion his lineups were often closer to the typical 4-2-3-1 / 4-3-3:
You can see the nominal positions in each XI above are the same – if you go back and look at Marseille XIs on Fotmob or the like, you will often see a 4-2-3-1 despite Marseille’s setup in possession looking like a back three – but the buildup structures look very different in practice.
At Brighton, the double pivot would usually stay close to one another, with one of the CM roles occasionally splitting the center backs, but with both typically holding central positions. This would change when Brighton drew opposition sides to one side of the pitch, where the CMs could often drop into fullback positions, allowing the fullback to push up, sometimes inverting.
The movement of the striker and central attacking midfielder was key to drawing defenses out of shape and breaking the lines, with the CAM/#10 particularly given freedom to find pockets of space and drop while wingers or fullbacks made runs. Their interplay with the striker was hugely important, providing an option for a quick pass or second ball when the striker dropped to receive possession, with the #10 then driving forward to engage with his fellow attackers. This meant wingers typically stayed high and wide in buildup, often only contributing once the ball was played through the lines, then capitalizing on the space created by the striker’s movement. It’s a structure not too dissimilar to… wait for it… Thomas Frank at Brentford. But as you’ll read further down, the implementation and execution are quite different.
RDZ’s time at Marseille saw quite a different approach to how he utilized his midfield. He often relied on a single pivot player, as the back four transformed into a lopsided back three, with one fullback sitting deep and the other pushing up into an inverted midfield role. The other pivot role typically pushed up higher as well, with the front four operating in a manner not unlike RDZ’s Brighton system.
Was De Zerbi’s odd 3-1-3-3 buildup an evolution of his Brighton tactics; or was it a structure he specifically felt was suited to Ligue 1? Was it both? We’ll soon find out when we see Spurs play this weekend – but my thinking is given Spurs’ squad and comfort in a more standard 4-2-3-1, we will probably see something closer to De Zerbi’s Brighton – that’s if things go well.
Principles
Structures and formations are only part of tactics. What’s arguably more important is how a team plays moreso than where they stand. If I were to describe RDZ’s tactics badly, I’d say they were a bizarro combination of Franktics and Angeball. Now, before you start throwing things at me, allow me to elaborate by breaking down the way De Zerbi sets up his teams to play into a set of core tenets:
1. Bait the press
RDZ likes his teams to draw out an opposition – patient buildup to shift an opponent around before exploiting space with a couple of quick, direct passes and driving forward to outnumber the opposition defense. Once more, this is quite similar to Thomas Frank’s tactics, particularly at Brentford; however, there are two key differences: patience / risk; and buildup channels.
Frank tended to be quite risk-averse with his tactics. Though he liked to try to pull a team out of shape with deep buildup patterns to create “transition opportunities”, if there were no easy pass option he was quite comfortable for his sides to boot the ball upfield for the wingers or strikers to chase. He also tended to try pull the opposition into wide areas, before either going down the channel or looking for a quick switch.
De Zerbi tries to coach his sides to be much more patient. Often using his goalkeeper as an additional outfield player, his teams will regularly dwell on the ball, inviting pressure and looking for an opportunity for an aggressive pass, but very rarely resort to a long-ball option when under pressure. Instead, they will recycle and immediately look for an aggressive avenue forward. Though his sides do also pull opponents into wide areas, they tend to use that to find gaps for a pass back into the middle and progress the ball quickly up the center of the pitch before looking to spread the ball wide, isolating the wingers against opposition defenders.
This is where the similarities to Ange-ball begin to come into play. Risky, aggressive passing through the middle of the pitch with a view to creating wide overloads – and it’s one that can pay dividends, but one that can create opportunities for a well-drilled pressing opponent, especially given the lack of passing and technical ability in Spurs’ midfield. Spurs have also made the second most errors leading to goals in the Premier League, and those have come under the very conservative Frank and Igor Tudor; is adding additional risk by inviting pressure and attempting difficult passes the right approach?
2. Synchronized movement
This is where the similarities to Frank end, and the similarities to Ange Postecoglou become more evident. De Zerbi likes his sides to occupy and move into space. If there’s space to be found, players should move into it; however, if one player moves, so should his teammates. Distance between players is important, and it’s those synchronized movements that can make De Zerbi’s buildup play look so effortless – even when he is managing a team of players not especially blessed with technical ability. His sides always know where to find their teammates in any given scenario, and it doesn’t have to take a raking 40-yard pass.
This is arguably the most complex part of his tactics to implement, though: going from a rigid, field position-based structure to a more fluid, dynamic expression can take some learning, and it’s something Spurs could struggle to take on without a preseason to adjust. Some of those who trained under Ange, however, such as Pedro Porro, Dominic Solanke, Rodrigo Bentancur, Archie Gray, and others could potentially pick up the lessons more quickly given their time under the Australian learning similar methods.
3. The third man
This principle is arguably the most core to how De Zerbi wants his sides to function, and in some ways it’s a product of the first two: lure the press, play a (potentially risky) pass to a player who may have a defender tight on him, with that player then making a very simple one-touch pass to a teammate in space. That player then can quickly drive the ball forward either on the dribble or via another pass. It sounds simple, and in a lot of ways it is – but it can also be quite difficult to combat, not unlike a simple one-two in the attacking third.
Often, this looks like a pass from the center backs into a marked midfielder; often though, that player’s midfield partner is free, with the opposing attacker pressing the defense. A quick flick around the corner and the partner is in space. Other times it can look like the #10 dropping to receive a pass, laying it off to a CM, or sometimes a more direct ball into the striker, where the #10 is now the free “third man”.
This creates transition opportunities (it sounds like I’m talking Frank again!) and this is where De Zerbi’s attack can differ from Ange-ball. Postecoglou often looked to use brute force, overwhelming a defense with vertical runs with as many as seven players joining the attack; De Zerbi doesn’t need his teams to commit those numbers forward, as the third man passes ensure the attackers already outnumber the defense with the opposition attack and midfield often caught out of position.
As mentioned above, it doesn’t require a high competency in terms of long passing (though ball playing ability from the center backs is very useful); but it does require a level of technical ability and press resistance, especially in midfield, that Spurs are sorely lacking. It’s a style of play with which somebody like Pape Matar Sarr could struggle; while Yves Bissouma could take to it like a fish to water.
4. High press
Off the ball, De Zerbi’s defensive shape is similar to Frank’s: two banks of four, with the attacking midfielder and striker sitting in front of them. His defensive approach, however, is much more in line with Ange Postecoglou’s: an aggressive, man-to-man press that suffocates opponents and tries to win the ball back high up the pitch.
That sounds great – until it isn’t. De Zerbi’s sides tend to not be the most defensively robust, and a good passing side can slice through a man-to-man press if triggers aren’t acted upon and the defense doesn’t move with cohesion. Again, this is something that will be challenging to implement given Spurs have struggled to enact any sort of structured press for the better part of 18 months now, and with no preseason to train said triggers and structures, Spurs could end up exposing their defense more than they have already this season.
Profiles
So what kind of players does De Zerbi prefer to enact his aggressive tactics?
At a high level, there’s a couple of overall attributes that are useful in RDZ’s system. Positional intelligence and awareness are key, or at the very least teachability: knowing where to move, when, and in sync with teammates is a big part of what makes De Zerbi’s tactics function. Patience and calmness on the ball are vital as well; playing in this style is going to result in high-pressure situations where a mistake can create big chances for the opposition. Probing for an opening and not panicking when taking a poor touch or misplacing a pass allows the team to recover in problematic circumstances.
By position though, there are some more specific traits that come in handy. Passing ability and quality on the ball at the back is really important, and Cristian Romero will probably love playing under De Zerbi for this reason. Slowing down the play and luring out the opponent before playing an incisive pass forward is exactly where the Argentine excels.
With regards to the fullbacks, De Zerbi will probably like the versatility he has at his disposal, with all of Djed Spence, Pedro Porro, and Destiny Udogie having different strengths and weaknesses. Often using the fullbacks in a lopsided manner with one holding width (either in attack or sitting deep) and the other inverting into a more attacking midfield role, Porro especially will be comfortable with the latter given his time under Ange Postecoglou, while Spence’s defensive ability and engine will lend themselves well to the former. Destiny Udogie probably has the capability to do either depending on who is on the opposite side.
Shifting to the attack, for the striker role, interplay with the attacking midfielder and intelligent movement are key. Out wide De Zerbi likes 1v1 specialists, though at times via different expressions, sometimes opting for a lopsided setup like with the fullbacks: one in a more direct role using pace to get in behind his defender, with the other more liable to cut inside and use dribbling or clever passing to create opportunities. Dominic Solanke, Mathys Tel, and Mohammed Kudus (if he has recovered from injury) are the most likely options here, with Richarlison potentially the one to come in if Kudus is not fit.
Next, we have the midfield. Xavi Simons is the obvious player for the #10 role, with his ability to float between the lines, pick up possession, and turn and drive forward into space before linking up with other attackers exactly in line with how De Zerbi likes that role to function. For the central midfielders, press resistance is arguably the most important component of at least one of the CM positions, with that one typically more of a holder and the other a runner. Yves Bissouma is arguably the most press resistant of Spurs’ midfielders and played a similar role at Brighton, albeit before De Zerbi’s time on the south coast. He’s been carrying an injury, however, like another who may find a new lease of life under De Zerbi in Rodrigo Bentancur. Given that, Archie Gray’s experience at fullback and calmness on the ball lends itself well to a position that often finds itself dropping into fullback positions, and this will probably see him preferred over the more mercurial Lucas Bergvall. Pape Matar Sarr could also struggle to see the pitch, with his poor first touch a hindrance to the execution of De Zerbi’s tactics. Conor Gallagher probably makes the most sense alongside Gray from the options available.
Lastly, there is the goalkeeper. I mentioned above the importance of the keeper role in De Zerbi’s buildup – and this is where Guglielmo Vicario WILL struggle. It’s also unlikely he’ll feature this soon following his hernia surgery, so Antonin Kinsky will likely be in the XI. He is more technically gifted than Vicario, but his shot-stopping is limited and he will still be haunted by his experience against Atletico Madrid.
And that’s perhaps the biggest concern. Given how things have eventuated this season, Spurs’ confidence is at an all-time low – and a high-risk, aggressive approach that has a tendency to concede goals could cause the team to absolutely implode. How often this season has a silly mistake gifted the opposition an early goal with Spurs then collapsing into a shambles as the focus and intent are replaced by panic? It’s for this reason that Roberto De Zerbi (from a purely footballing standpoint) is a hugely risky hire. Complex tactics that take time to implement with a very real potential to hemorrhage goals is arguably the last thing Spurs need right now.
But could it work?
Potential lineup against Sunderland
