Before I start, a few things:
This was originally posted on The Daily Hilario on Monday, 12th October. If you have already read it there, it has incorporated the gist of my responses to comments made in order to avoid repetition.
Despite the title, I’m not an investment analyst. However, I have worked alongside private equity (“PE”) firms so I understand something about how they work, or to be more accurate – particularly in this case – used to be the way they worked.
I’m a veteran Chelsea fan who has
lived through bad times as well as good times. So I’ve got a protectionist perspective about the club and was concerned about the acquisition by BlueCo.
From my work experiences of how PE’s work, this is their basic way of working:
- take loans and buy the business as cheaply as possible;
- change pretty much everything about the acquired business on the basis the existing business is badly run (Eghbali: “Chelsea were not terribly well managed on the football side, sporting side or promotional side”);
- asset strip to pay back their initial loans and pay themselves dividends;
- get out when things have reached optimal medium-term profitability, almost always within 5 years. (BlueCo cannot do this with Chelsea because of the terms of the purchase agreement prevent an external sale for 10 years, i.e., 2032.)
With that said, here’s my view of how BlueCo and the investment community would see things…
The key point is that BlueCo’s Chelsea investment should be assessed not simply through transfer spending or individual player profits, but through the total sporting and commercial asset base being built toward a potential 2032 exit. You have to judge BlueCo as an investment, not just as an owner of a football team.
They paid £2.5bn for the club and promised another £1.75bn to put into the stadium, academy, women’s team etc. That second amount wasn’t paid to Abramovich; it was money to be invested in the club in the undefined ‘future’ and in an undefined manner.
Although much was talked about a new stadium, nothing was in the terms of sale. So far as I’m aware, there was no penalty for not making this additional spend.
Since 2022, Chelsea have transformed from a relatively mature squad valued at about €1.02bn. Now after the 2026 window it’s about €1.42bn, with an average age of only 23.3 with potentially appreciating football assets such as Cole Palmer, Moisés Caicedo, João Pedro and others. The academy, loan players, Strasbourg and other young players add another layer of developmental and saleable assets.
Consequently, the important measure is value created and realised, rather than simply today’s squad valuation: BlueCo has already crystallised significant player-sale value while retaining a large, young player asset base.
That €400m rise is actually understated, because in-between they sold more than €1bn worth of players. So they sold a lot AND still ended up with a more valuable, much younger squad. This increase has also been fuelled by transfer-fee inflation, with BlueCo actively participating in, even creating, that expanding market. They also own lots of young players at the academy, on loan, and at Strasbourg as a pipeline for future increases.
Strasbourg also provides the clearest evidence that this is an asset-development strategy rather than simply an interpretation of Chelsea’s transfer policy. Since the acquisition, BlueCo has invested heavily in young players and Strasbourg has repeatedly bought, developed and sold young talent. In the 2026 summer window alone, Strasbourg generated roughly €200m of reported transfer receipts against about €99m of spending, with major sales including Diego Moreira for €50m, Valentín Barco for €40m and Julio Enciso for around €30m.
BlueCo is demonstrably acquiring, developing, moving and selling football assets across more than one club. That does not prove that the strategy is profitable overall, because wages (which actually declined), operating costs, financing, transfer costs and other expenditure have to be included. But the mechanism itself is visible.
At club level, Chelsea’s estimated enterprise value has risen substantially. Forbes had Chelsea at approximately $3.1bn in 2022 and $4.2bn in 2026. Stamford Bridge, Cobham, the academy, women’s team, brand and commercial platform provide additional underlying value. The Forbes figures are valuation estimates rather than actual transaction prices, but they provide a useful external mark of how the club’s value has developed.
The investment therefore increasingly resembles long-term asset management: acquire Chelsea, invest heavily in young sporting assets and infrastructure, develop and monetise players, use Strasbourg and other parts of the portfolio as additional development channels, reinvest the proceeds, grow revenues and improve the overall value of the football enterprise.
Recent transactions demonstrate substantial sporting-asset appreciation: Liverpool rose from ~£300m in 2010 to ~£5.5bn in 2026 (+17x); Aston Villa rose from an implied valuation of approximately £55m in 2018 to more than £500m in 2024 (+8x); the Boston Celtics from ~$360m to $6.1bn (+16x); and the LA Lakers from $10bn in 2025 to $12.5bn in 2026 (+25% in 14 months). These are not directly comparable investments, and the increases reflect both individual value creation and the wider re-rating of sporting assets, but they demonstrate the scale of appreciation that can occur for sporting assets.
Everton provides another example of the increase in sporting asset values. The Friedkin Group acquired the club in December 2024 at a reported total cost of approximately £331m, including debt repayment and transaction costs. Having stabilised its finances, refinanced its debt and overseen the move to the new Hill Dickinson Stadium (but didn’t pay any of the planning costs and necessarily paid for the whole cost of building), Friedkin announced in October 2026 that it was exploring new investment, including the possible sale of a controlling interest. Reports have put a potential valuation at around £800m including debt although, as it hasn’t yet been sold, this is an unproven valuation.
After last month’s share transfer announcement we have a much more tangible indication of what Chelsea may be worth. The reports say that Todd Boehly and Mark Walter are selling their combined 25.6% stake to Clearlake for around £950m, implying a Chelsea valuation of approximately £5bn including debt – way above the Forbes assessment earlier this year. This is particularly interesting because it is an actual transaction between existing investors, rather than an external valuation estimate. Boehly and Walter’s combined stake was originally worth roughly £640m on the basis of the £2.5bn share purchase in 2022, so the reported sale price represents a substantial increase in the value of their investment [£310m, +48%], although the precise return cannot be calculated without knowing their subsequent capital contributions and other investment terms.
The additional significance of this is that Clearlake is not simply sitting on an investment and hoping that the club becomes more valuable. It is prepared to put another £950m of its own capital into acquiring the remaining interests of two of its original partners and effectively taking full control. The purchase agreement prevented any sale during the 10 year post-purchase period to ensure a real long-term investment rather the usual quick asset strip approach. This doesn’t prove what Chelsea will ultimately be worth in 2032. But it provides considerably stronger evidence that the asset-development strategy has produced a materially more valuable Chelsea than the one acquired in 2022.
Most importantly, this transaction undervalues the potential 2032 price. Under the terms of the sale by Abramovich, until 2032 the only transaction can be between existing BlueCo shareholders. Effectively and realistically, Hansjörg Wyss wasn’t an option, so it was a transaction with only one potential buyer. This is totally different to 2032 when it’s an open market and potentially multiple bidders.
If by 2032 they have a rebuilt stadium (Chelsea Pitch Owners have power over a move away from the Bridge, but no legal say about rebuild and temporary relocation), higher income, Champions League football, consistent high value sponsors, and a young squad worth well over £1bn, BlueCo could be selling a fundamentally more valuable enterprise: a buyer in 2032 could pay far more than what they paid in 2022.
Chelsea’s 2032 exit valuation could therefore be materially higher because the underlying market for sporting assets is rapidly expanding. If the market for elite sporting franchises continues to escalate, BlueCo could benefit from both the value it creates itself and appreciation of the underlying asset class. The sale to Clearlake estimates Chelsea’s enterprise value at approximately £5bn in 2026, an increase of 100%. By 2032, no-one knows how much their asset will be worth: but, be sure, they’re betting on it being closer to £10bn. than £5bn.
It’s worth discussing whether they will build the new stadium or not. My own view is that it’s highly unlikely they’ll stay longer than 2032. The normal period for an investment is maximum 5 years. They’ll be looking to cash out and go onto another prospective high growth investment. I feel that the talk of a new stadium is BlueCo posturing in order to placate the fans. They will need most of the next 6 years to get planning permission and build. Only then can they start making a return on that investment. More likely that it will be part of the selling prospectus to say to the potential buyers that, if planning permission is granted (and that’s a big ‘if’), it’s all ready to be completed and you can reap all the rewards.
The key financial question will be whether the aggregate value of these assets and the eventual sale proceeds exceed the capital deployed and the costs of financing and operating the portfolio.
A hypothetical £6bn Chelsea enterprise value in 2032, for example, would not represent £3.5bn of gross profit. Debt [currently standing at ~£1.4 bn], shareholder interests, accumulated operating losses, financing costs, infrastructure expenditure, taxes, and transaction costs would have to be deducted or otherwise accounted for.
Then we move onto the question who will buy the club. Most of the football club purchases over the last ~10 years have been from countries and/or companies seeking to boost their countries football base and/or image for tourism and investment (e.g. China, Thailand, Qatar, Abu Dhabi). Egos are very important in this world and as both Boehly and, more so, Eghbali think that they’re the smart guys and everybody else are dumbf**kers. Ditto Jim Radcliffe at Man Utd. Selling to another big ego, especially one on the way up the ego ladder, will be very important. I believe that BlueCo are speculating that there are more potential investors than the US and, dare I think or say it, from the Middle East. I also think we’ll see more Indian billionaires coming into the sport (Forbes says there are 3,428 billionaires in the world, let alone further companies and private equity funds).
So from a BlueCo perspective, it’s about maximising the total investment value to reach a highpoint by 2032 and then sell.
Despite my initial scepticism, I have to say that, from an asset management point of view, rather than as a Chelsea fan’s perspective, they’re doing well so far and laying the foundations for the next phase of faster asset valuation growth.
If you’ve made it to the end, thanks very much for reading.
