Matt LaFleur has come under fire in the last couple of years for some of his decision-making on 4th down. The Shanahan tree guys had always been more conservative on 4th down than I would have thought
(given how forward-thinking they are about offensive football), but LaFleur seemed to buck that trend early on, only to become more conservative in 2023 & 2024.
If the early season returns are any indication, LaFleur may have rediscovered his aggressive ways. Against the Cardinals, LaFleur went for it on 4th down 3 times, converting 2 of them (and coming within about a foot of converting the third for a huge TD to Romeo Doubs).
Today we’re going to look at the Packers last 4th down of the game: the one that set up the game-winning TD.
The Packers are facing 4th & 2 at the Cardinals 29 yard line, down 23-20 with 2:32 remaining in the game. A field goal here would tie the game, while giving the Cardinals 2+ minutes (along with the 2 minute warning) to get into range for a game-winning field goal.
LaFleur originally called for the field goal unit to come out, only to change his mind, call a timeout and put the offense back on the field.
The Packers are in 11 personnel (1 RB, 1 TE, 3 WR) in a 3×1 shotgun look. Romeo Doubs [87] is the isolated WR on the right, while Tucker Kraft [85], Matthew Golden [0] and Malik Heath [18] are in a bunch on the left. The Cardinals are showing 3 safeties – all in a line – 9 yards from the line of scrimmage.
Before the snap, Golden shifts wide out of the bunch, leaving the Cardinals with 2 defenders tight to the line and a safety over the top.
The Packers are running a version of Two-Man Stick, a quick-game concept that consists of two receivers running quick-breaking routes at ~5 yards. It’s something they had run 12 times coming into this game. In this game, they ran it 8 times prior to this play, gaining an average of 5.25 yards on those plays (sporting a 50% success rate on those calls).
On this version, Golden and Heath are running the Stick routes, while Kraft is running a corner route over the top. This is different than how they typically run it, which is to send the outside receiver vertical as a clear-out and have the inside two men run the Stick routes.
On Stick, the inside man often has an option to either run the out route or run a hitch route, depending on the leverage. The Packers showed that hitch route quite a few times in this game and the Cardinals started finding ways to take it away.
At the snap, Golden and Heath release vertically upfield before breaking on their routes. Golden breaks outside while Heath snaps back on a hitch. The Cardinals play this well, sticking with the receivers. Love hits the top of his drop and looks to fire, but there aren’t any good options.
Meanwhile, Budda Baker [3] has crashed on Kraft from the middle of the field, only to find Kraft is not sitting down at the sticks. That leaves Kraft one-on-one with Dadrian Taylor-Demerson [42]. A slight outside bend to the route stem gives Kraft outside leverage.
When Love moves off Stick, he progresses to Kraft who is now breaking on a corner route. That initial bend in the route gives Kraft leverage, and the break on corner route gives him the separation he needs.
Love lofts the ball to the outside and Kraft comes up with a huge catch for a 15 yard gain and a 1st down.
Josh Jacobs would finish off the drive with his second rushing touchdown 3 plays later and the Packers would take a 27-23 lead.
The Cardinals drove down the field and got into field goal range, but, after Micah Parsons’ 3rd sack, they weren’t able to finish it off with a touchdown.
Albums listened to: James Iha – Let It Come Down; Slothrust – Wildcard; Melody’s Echo Chamber – Melody’s Echo Chamber
