For decades, Iran assembled one of the most successful power-projection networks in the modern Middle East. Rather than relying solely on its own military power, Tehran built a constellation of armed partners stretching from Lebanon and Gaza to Syria, Iraq and Yemen.
Together, they formed what Iranian officials proudly called the “axis of resistance
” and what outside observers came to know as Iran’s "ring of fire."The strategy served multiple purposes. It threatened Israel, expanded Iranian influence across the region and allowed Tehran to challenge its adversaries while keeping much of the fighting far from its own borders.
Better, in Iran’s view, for conflict to play out in Beirut, Damascus, Gaza, Baghdad and Sanaa than in Tehran itself.
The
strategy was clever. Iran could intimidate its neighbors, threaten global commerce, pressure the United States and destabilize the region without bearing the full costs and risks of direct confrontation.
As analysts debate what the U.S. war with Iran accomplished, attention has focused on Iran’s nuclear program, its remaining military capabilities and the regime’s staying power. Yet it’s worth recognizing one of the war’s most consequential but underappreciated outcomes: the steady dismantling of the regional network through which Tehran projected power across the Middle East.
Iran's regional ambitions have been scaled back across Middle East
For years, Tehran’s influence rested on a network that gave it strategic depth. Hamas threatened Israel from Gaza. Hezbollah amassed an arsenal on Israel’s northern border, while serving as Iran’s most powerful regional proxy.
Syria provided the logistical bridge connecting Tehran to Lebanon and the Mediterranean. Iraqi militias extended Iranian influence westward while pressuring American forces. The Houthis gave Tehran a foothold on one of the world’s most important maritime choke points.
That network allowed Iran to keep its adversaries under pressure while minimizing risks to itself. Today, much of that architecture has been degraded.
Hamas remains in control of parts of Gaza, but much of its senior leadership has been killed, large portions of its military infrastructure have been destroyed, and its ability to rearm and reorganize has been sharply constrained by Israel’s operational presence in significant areas of the Gaza Strip.
Hezbollah remains dangerous, yet it is no longer the force it was before the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks. The group has also lost much of its senior leadership, including longtime Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, along with key commanders, weapons stockpile and infrastructure.
Hezbollah now faces growing pressure inside Lebanon from a population exhausted by economic collapse and increasingly unwilling to see the country’s future subordinated to Iran’s regional ambitions. The group still possesses formidable capabilities, but it is increasingly focused on preserving what remains rather than expanding its influence.
Syria may represent the most consequential loss. For decades, the Assad regime served as Iran’s indispensable ally and the critical land bridge connecting Tehran to Hezbollah. The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government and the emergence of a new political order have severely disrupted those supply lines and deprived Iran of one of the central pillars of its regional strategy.
In Iraq, Iranian-backed groups continue to wield considerable influence, but they operate in an environment that is increasingly complicated by Iraqi nationalism, domestic political pressures, and growing demands that armed groups answer to the Iraqi state rather than to Tehran.
Only the Houthis retain something approaching their previous freedom of action, continuing to threaten commercial shipping and disrupt maritime trade. Yet even there, Iran’s success reveals its limitations. The Houthis can create instability, but they cannot create regional order.
Iran is being forced to play defense
The result is that Iran increasingly finds itself doing something it spent decades trying to avoid: relying on its own territory and its own capabilities to sustain confrontation.
An equally important shift is taking place elsewhere in the region.
For years, many Arab governments concluded that accommodation was the safest response to Iranian aggression. After months of unrelenting attacks on their territory, that assumption is changing.
Bahrain and Kuwait have launched strikes inside Iran, Saudi forces have joined attacks on Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates has reportedly provided intelligence and air cover. Persian Gulf states are also deepening cooperation on missile defense, intelligence sharing and maritime security.
In attacking its neighbors, Iran has pushed its adversaries closer together and closer to the United States.
Iran remains powerful, but less so than before
None of this means Iran is on the verge of collapse. Its missile program remains formidable. Its nuclear ambitions are a source of legitimate concern. Tehran retains the ability to disrupt global commerce, and it has repeatedly demonstrated that even a weakened network can impose real costs on other nations.
But there is an important distinction between the ability to disrupt and the ability to shape the regional order. For decades, Iran played offense. Today, it finds itself increasingly on defense.
That could prove to be the most consequential outcome of this war. Not the destruction of the axis of resistance, but the gradual unraveling of the network through which Iran projected power across the Middle East.
The ring of fire has not disappeared, but it has become a ring of embers.
Aviva Klompas is the chief executive officer and cofounder of Boundless, a nonprofit dedicated to fighting antisemitism. She is also the host of the "Boundless Insights" podcast.
This article originally appeared on USA TODAY: Iran was a regional threat. War with the US changed that. | Opinion
