In this week's It’s Debatablearticle, Rick Rosen and Charles Moster explore if the military’s reliance on Mutual Assured Destruction to prevent nuclear war is a recipe for disaster. Rosen retired as a professor from the Texas Tech University School of Law and is a retired U.S. Army colonel. Moster is the Founder of the Moster Law Firm based in Lubbock with offices in Austin, Dallas, Houston, and Midland. He is also a technologist, software developer, and author of numerous published books in the areas of AI, futurism, and the law. He has contributed legal articles and seminars on whether the coming conscious computers should be granted full legal rights by the Supreme Court.
Moster argues 'luck will run out' with MAD
If nuclear deterrence – otherwise known as Mutual Assured Destruction
- were to fail, Amarillo would be immediately incinerated in less than a fraction of a second as air temperatures exceed the surface of the sun.
A 7.5 megaton nuclear missile unleashed by Russia’s monstrous Sarmat (Satan II) would deliver the explosive yield of 500 Hiroshima’s.
Amarillo is a likely target given the location of the Pantex nuclear facility, but Lubbock would likely be spared, at least initially.
Tragically, the radioactive fallout would follow shortly thereafter leading to the death of everyone who may be reading this column.
Add to that, the combined effect of Russia’s ICBMS delivering 930 warheads, submarine missiles packing 640 warheads, and bombers carrying 200 gravity bombs.
According to nuclear researcher Annie Jacobson in her frightening and monumental book, Nuclear War, the entire United States population would be dead or dying in less than one hour.
This is not a fringe projection, but supported by data from every national source.
Oh, forgot to mention that Uncle Sam would do the same to the Russians, North Koreans, and – of course – Iranians. And forget about Europe which would be gone in an instant.
MAD rests on the supposition that no country would be irrational enough to launch a nuclear attack given the 100% risk of its own annihilation.
Unfortunately, this underlying assumption upon which all our lives depend, will ultimately fail.
A fundamental deficiency is the inability of the U.S. to effectively respond to what has been called “a bolt out of the blue."
As dramatized in the Netflix horror show, A House of Dynamite, the Supreme Leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, launches a single ICBM – the Hwasong-18 from an undetectable mobile launcher, intending to obliterate all of Washington in about 30 minutes with the explosive power of 17 Hiroshima’s.
The dilemma is that we only have 44 interceptors in our arsenal which are not effective once the missile goes hypersonic at Mach 20 or higher.
Assuming the U.S. cannot shoot down the incoming missile, the American President would be forced to move to DEFCOM 1 and launch our nuclear weapons.
Such a response would likely lead to uncontrolled escalation by Russia and China motivated to use or lose their nuclear weapons.
A worldwide nuclear exchange would inevitably follow.
Of course, the above scenario only assumes a single launch. U.S. intelligence now believes that N. Korea can launch nuclear weapons from submarines which could be anywhere with impact in as short as 10 minutes.
Increase the number of weapons, decrease the response time – well, you get the picture.
As to rationality, there is little evidence that Kim Jong Un – who blew up his uncle with an anti-aircraft gun, poisoned his brother with VX nerve agent, and has directed the “dead hand” of his nuclear arsenal to destroy America if he is assassinated, is anything close to “sane."
Do you feel comfortable turning your life and family over to Kim Jung Un? Let’s say his obesity/smoking leads to sudden death or – worse – he is assassinated internally. Well, you get the picture – again.
And then there’s miscalculation.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the world came within minutes of nuclear war. A Soviet submarine was cut off from communications and under U.S. attack from depth charges intended to force it to the surface. The captain wanted to launch a nuclear torpedo but needed two other officers to agree.
Two agreed but one naval officer, Vasily Arkhipov, dissented. Had he succumbed to the pressure of the moment, none of us would likely be alive today.
The point is the high probability of miscalculation, particularly when the time window is 30 minutes or less. This is compounded by AI systems like Claude which are known to “hallucinate” and generate false data upon which automated systems respond without human intervention. It is very easy to imagine the sudden appearance of “phantom missiles” generated by AI intending to maximize some misaligned goal. It’s coming.
Real world examples abound, the two most frightening being the 1979 NORAD incident where a training tape left in a computer displayed an all-out incoming nuclear attack on the U.S.
Bombers were loading up when the mistake was uncovered. Ditto for the 1983 Soviet false alarm when missiles were seemingly launched from our side. An astute Soviet officer saved us again. And then – there was the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket which led then Russian President Yeltsin to fumble through his “nuclear football” for the launch codes given a mistaken interpretation. We got lucky again.
I am certain – and very sorry to report – that our luck will eventually run out.
MAD is a recipe for disaster.
Rosen takes 'not so fast' approach on MAD
Charles describes the “parade of horribles” that could result from a failure of a “Mutual Assured Destruction” policy of deterrence. I can neither refute nor minimize the existential horror of a nuclear holocaust; however, Charles’ argument has two problems: (1) MAD had not been U.S. policy for over 65 years; and (2) Charles offers no alternatives to reliance, at least in part, on strong nuclear deterrence.
First, MAD is not U.S. policy. Following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy offered a strategy short of all-out retaliation in the event of a nuclear attack that became known as “flexible response.”
The policy was ultimately codified in a presidential defense directive. The latest Defense Department Nuclear Posture Review, published as part of the 2022 National Defense Strategy, provides that if deterrence fails, “the United States would seek to end any conflict at the lowest level of damage possible on the best achievable terms for the United States and its Allies and partners.”
Incontrovertibly, the United States requires a credible nuclear force capable of withstanding an enemy first strike. Deterrence remains an indispensable key to preventing nuclear war. The Nuclear Posture Review states: “For the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons will continue to provide unique deterrence effects that no other element of U.S. military power can replace. To deter aggression and preserve our security in the current security environment, we will maintain nuclear forces that are responsive to the threats we face.”
Second, even if MAD was U.S. policy, Charles offers no alternatives to a strong nuclear deterrence. Does Charles suggest that we should not have a nuclear arsenal? If so, what would prevent enemy nations from threatening or launching devastating nuclear attacks against us? We don’t live in a Kumbaya world—a naïve state of total peace, harmony, and cooperation among people. The United States requires nuclear weapons to dissuade potential enemies from using such weapons against us or our allies.
Of course, deterrence alone is not sufficient to prevent a possible nuclear conflict. The United States must establish an effective defense against nuclear attacks on the nation and its allies. Arms control and nonproliferation treaties may reduce the likelihood of nuclear war but only if they are absolutely verifiable. Finally, the United States must maintain a strong convential force that enables the country to set a high bar before having to rely upon nuclear weapons and to prevent enemy states, such as Iran, from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Moster argues now is time to prepare
Rick's first point is really one of semantics as to the difference between MAD and “Credible Deterrence" (used in testimony before Congress along with “Strategic Deterrence”). The latter is based on the premise that the U.S. can withstand a first strike and retaliate with full nuclear capacity. That is precisely the rationale of MAD which psychologically deters the enemy from initiating a first strike, given the certainty of deadly retaliation.
That said, Rick's second concern raises the fundamental question as to how we should respond to the military threat of a first strike, which I believe is quite probable. I propose three scenarios for serious consideration.
The first scenario would be the response to what I previously referred to as a "bolt out of the blue," which might be a nuclear launch by a rogue nation involving five or less nuclear capable missiles. As "A House of Dynamite" illustrates, our current ballistic missile defenses would likely fail, giving the President very little choice but to launch a retaliatory strike with full nuclear capability, plunging the world into Armageddon.
I would propose the immediate development and implementation of hundreds of defensive missiles, which could be applied to any incoming target and increase the probability of success to near 100%. To even think that we could protect the country with less than 50 interceptor missiles is insanity. Current military spending assessments indicate that the proposed defense system could be achieved for less than $250 million, which is a ridiculously low cost to protect the United States from nuclear annihilation. The system would also have secondary resources, including lasers and anti-drone capabilities to augment the ABM protocol and increase the odds of interception.
In that my major concern is the potential nuclear launch by a nation such as North Korea or Iran, or an accidental launch, this first scenario would be incredibly effective in protecting America from catastrophic losses.
In the unlikely situation where at least one nuclear missile from a rogue nation got through, there should be an established “route protocol” with Russian and China such that any retaliatory missile launches NOT fly over their territory which would trigger a catastrophic response.
I would suggest an alternative communication system akin to the original Washington-Kremlin “hotline” which would share trajectory information so that such a launch could be independently verified as not being hostilely directed at Russia or China.
The conundrum involves the second scenario where the enemy launches at least 100 missiles which would likely overwhelm the system along the lines just proposed. In that situation, we should configure umbrella protection to safeguard major population centers, financial hubs, medical facilities, and electric production. It would be a grizzly task to designate what cities would benefit from such a situation, but it would obviously involve urban centers such as Houston, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and similar areas. The political/social systems would need to operate independently without reliance on the state and national governments. Additionally, expanded shelters would be constructed for hospitals and medical facilities.
In the same vein, designated rural areas would also be established to ensure the survival of smaller but critical population centers, which demand the same level of care, protection, and continuation.
The third and final scenario is the most problematic as there is no viable defense against an all-out nuclear attack which would involve thousands of nuclear weapons.
This scenario can only anticipate designated areas intended to withstand this worst-case scenario. Arguably, hardened facilities could be constructed in rural communities with lower population centers and deemed less valuable targets to our enemies. Should all other cities be obliterated, these areas would be the repository for our technical knowledge entirely lost in a nuclear exchange including computer facilities, educational resources, and medical assets. This "Noah's Ark" scenario would be intended to maintain our way of life.
Given the need for genetic diversity, measures would need to be implemented to prevent population bottleneck. Although highly controversial, we should seriously consider storing frozen embryos and sperm which would allow for genetic diversity, given the small number of survivors and the necessity of creating the next generation.
As the ultimate safeguard for human cultural/technical/scientific information, I would propose constructing and launching a “Noah’s Ark Spacecraft” similar to the historic Voyagers which would receive daily uploads from the internet. On a trajectory out of the solar system and beyond the physical reach of global militaries, it would independently transmit data to human receivers on a continuum of frequencies.
Assuming a civilization survives capable of receiving this data stream and able to comprehend its content, the vast knowledge accumulated over the ages will never be lost.
I'm truly amazed that there is no serious discussion of these critical issues and potential alternatives as I suggest.
Although subject to debate, we should be able to implement this entire three scenario strategy for $1 trillion or less. Small price to pay for our survival as a civilization and – species.
Rosen argues prevention should be a priority
I fully agree with Charles’ argument for a strong and effective missile defense, but I am unsure where Charles stands on the need for a strong nuclear deterrent; that is, the ability to strike an adversary that employs nuclear weapons against the United States. His focus is on defensive capability and preventing the eradication of our population and culture in the event of an attack.
While defensive capabilities are important, without confronting a strong U.S. nuclear arsenal, nuclear-armed enemies will almost certainly test our defenses; they have nothing to lose. Indeed, enemies could attack the United States with impunity.
At the very least, they could use the threat of nuclear attack to blackmail the United States and achieve their foreign policy objectives through conventional means. While missile defense complements counterforce capability, defense alone is insufficient.
Although they disagree about many issues, both Democratic and Republican administrations have consistently recognized that nuclear weapons are indispensable to deterring aggression and preserving our security.
Naval War College Professor Daniel Post wrote in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings that to be effective “nuclear deterrence partially hinges on the principle that the adversaries are (and perceive themselves to be) vulnerable to a punishment threatened if an adversary crosses specified red lines or menaces the vital interests of the state.” Moreover, “[a]dversaries must know that if they threaten U.S. interests, the U.S. will be willing and able to deny benefits and impose unacceptable costs. Credibility requires demonstrating nuclear capabilities and the will to use them.”
While protecting our population and culture from a nuclear attack is imperative, preventing the attack in the first place must be our priority. Consequently, the United States must maintain a robust nuclear counterstrike capability.
This article originally appeared on Lubbock Avalanche-Journal: It's Debatable explores merits of Mutual Assured Destruction policy
