1 Year to Operation Sindoor: The Terror Footprint in Jammu and Kashmir After Pahalgam

Since the Pahalgam attack, the security landscape in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has seen a significant shift. The period between the attack and the time of writing did not see any verifiable instance of a sustained terrorist-initiated kinetic offensive from either Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) or Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). This shift is not perceptual but is borne out by data. As per the CNAWS J&K Terrorism Dataset, since Pahalgam, Security Forces (SFs) have neutralised 30 terrorists in 19 Counter Terror operations while sustaining 10 fatalities. The distribution of the violence is equally telling. In the valley, 20 terrorists have been eliminated with 5 SF casualties. However, in Jammu division, 10 terrorists have been eliminated, again with 5 fatalities among

the SFs.

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The Counter-Terror Grid Has Tightened

Interestingly, all these encounters were driven by state action rather than initiated by the terrorists. Earlier, attacks and counter-terror operations unfolded simultaneously, creating a continuous cycle of action and response on both sides. This shift towards the unilateral initiatives is important as it indicates not just operational effectiveness, but a temporary disruption in the ability of terrorist outfits to execute attacks. Several factors may explain this. The first is the bolstering of the CT and counter-infiltration grid in Jammu division. Security apparatus was already bolstered in the valley after the abrogation of Article 370. However, terrorist outfits reacted to this sustained CT pressure in the valley by exploiting the structural and operational loopholes in the CT grid of Jammu division. With time, the SFs worked upon those loopholes and the CT grid in Jammu division evolved into a tightly integrated system made it increasingly difficult for terrorists to infiltrate and operate undetected.

LeT, JeM Leadership Losses And The Collapse Of Local Recruitment

Second, between 2023 and 2025, both LeT and JeM have lost experienced commanders, affecting their ability to plan and execute complex attacks. Elimination of the notorious JeM commander Ateeq-ur-Rehman alias Saifullah along with two other cadres in Feb, 2026 put the final nail in the coffin. Third, pressure on overground worker (OGW) and Jammat-e-Islami networks has disrupted logistics, recruitment and hideout networks. Fourth is the drastic reduction in the terror recruitment of the locals from J&K to almost zero which was also reiterated by the Indian Army Chief Gen Upendra Dwivedi. A fifth, and often overlooked, factor may be strategic recalibration across the border. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has historically demonstrated an ability to adapt its proxy strategy in response to changing ground realities. Periods of reduced activity have not necessarily signalled retreat, rather, they have often preceded shifts in geography, tactics, or organisational structure.This is where caution becomes essential. Tactical dominance should not be conflated with strategic resolution. In the history of the Kashmir conflict, operational silence has frequently masked phases of regrouping and adaptation.

Why Tactical Silence Does Not Mean Strategic Defeat Of Terror Networks

There is ample historical precedent for this pattern. In the late 1990s, as counter-insurgency pressure increased in Kashmir, terrorism expanded into the Jammu division demonstrating a clear geographical shift under pressure. Similar expansion of terrorism to Jammu division was seen in the aftermath of abrogation of Article 370. When the Valley reflected a high degree of containment, LeT systematically activated Poonch and Rajouri in 2021 through its proxy outfit PAFF while JeM activated the Chenab region in 2024 through its front outfit Kashmir Tigers. Similarly, in the mid-2000s, sustained operations in J&K coincided with the rise of the Indian Mujahideen (IM), which extended the theatre of violence into India’s urban centres. Investigations have pointed to linkages between IM and LeT. The lesson is consistent that when constrained in one domain, the ISI-sponsored terrorist ecosystem adapts and mutate by exploiting the faultlines.

Hybrid Militancy And The Emerging Threat Beyond Jammu And Kashmir

Equally important is the evolution of terrorist tactics. The era of large, centrally directed insurgent formations has given way to more diffuse models involving hybrid militancy, small cells, and locally recruited operatives as was seen in the Red Fort blast last year. These decrease visibility and make it difficult to detect. What today, appears to be a pause in the violence, may in fact represent a stage of suppressed activity where these networks look dormant but in reality, they are evolving under sustained pressure. Numerous radicalised modules were arrested all over India in the previous year which points to a broader and more decentralized threat environment that is expanding beyond J&K.

Operation Sindoor And The Evolution Of India’s Security Doctrine

For policymakers, the implications are clear. First, the current tactical advantage needs to be maintained through regular intelligence-based Cordon and Search Operations (CASOs). Since the active terrorists in J&K are at an all-time low with almost non-existent local recruitment, the priority should be the maintenance of an effective counter-infiltration grid. Any relaxation of pressure risks allowing terrorist networks to regroup. Second, the vulnerable zones in Jammu should be given equal strategic importance as the valley. In general, as compared to the Kashmir division, the CT Operations in the Poonch-Rajouri and Chenab valley have seen limited success with security forces incurring rather high casualties. The rugged forested terrain in this area limits visibility and speed for the SFs while providing the terrorists with cover and escape routes in addition to the element of surprise. Third, counter-radicalisation efforts should supplement the kinetic operations to target the terror recruitment and support pipelines. Fourth, a robust intelligence and surveillance grid is required for the rest of India to monitor and disrupt hybrid and small cells well in time. The challenge is not merely to suppress attacks in the present, but to anticipate how the threat will evolve in response to that suppression.Bios of the authors:

Mohit Vashisth is the founder of the Centre for New Age Warfare Studies and a doctoral candidate at the Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University.Nikita Vats is the co-founder of the Centre for New Age Warfare Studies and a doctoral candidate at the Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University.