The Promise of a Connected India
Launched in 2016, the Ude Desh ka Aam Nagrik (UDAN) scheme was a transformative vision for Indian aviation. The goal was simple and powerful: make air travel affordable and accessible by connecting unserved and underserved airports in Tier-2 and Tier-3
cities. The model relied on Viability Gap Funding (VGF), a subsidy paid to airlines to bridge the gap between high operating costs and capped, affordable fares—initially around ₹2,500 for a one-hour flight. In return for this support, airlines were to operate on these commercially risky routes for at least three years, kickstarting local economies and bringing remote regions into the national mainstream.
A Reality Check on the Tarmac
Despite the ambitious rollout and the celebration of new airports, the reality on the ground has been sobering. Recent data shows a significant disconnect between ambition and execution. Of the 669 routes made operational since 2017, flights have been discontinued on nearly half of them. As of early 2026, only 336 routes were reported to be active. This isn't just a minor hiccup; it points to a systemic issue. For example, airports like Bidar and Kalaburagi in Karnataka saw daily flights disappear once their initial three-year subsidy period ended, demonstrating that temporary financial support does not guarantee a permanent market. Reports from Uttar Pradesh showed a similar pattern, with several newly launched airports having scheduled flights suspended due to low passenger footfall.
The Unsustainable Economics of Short Flights
The core of the problem lies in basic economics. Many UDAN routes were simply not commercially viable from the outset. The primary challenge is insufficient passenger demand. While the idea of connecting every town is appealing, not every route has enough travellers year-round to fill seats and make operations profitable for airlines. Once the three-year VGF support runs out, airlines face the harsh reality of low passenger loads and are forced to withdraw services. This is compounded by the high operating costs of regional aviation, including fuel, maintenance, and airport charges. Smaller airlines, which are crucial to the scheme's success, often operate on razor-thin margins and lack the financial resilience to absorb losses on unpopular routes.
Hype vs. Hard Numbers
The narrative around UDAN has often been dominated by the hype of inaugurating new terminals and connecting a record number of airports. While India's airport count has impressively grown from 74 in 2014 to over 160, the success of a connectivity scheme cannot be measured by infrastructure alone. A launched route is not the same as a sustained one. Audits have revealed a stark pattern: a large percentage of awarded routes never even commenced operations, and of those that did, only a tiny fraction remained operational after the subsidy period ended. This gap between the number of routes announced and the number that actually survive highlights the need for a more critical assessment, moving beyond press releases to focus on long-term operational health.
Infrastructure and a Flawed Network Design
Beyond market demand, structural and infrastructural hurdles persist. Many regional airstrips selected for the scheme faced significant delays in becoming operational due to regulatory bottlenecks and high compliance costs. Airlines were awarded routes but couldn't fly them because the airports weren't ready. Furthermore, many experts point to a flawed network design. For regional routes to be truly viable, they need seamless connectivity to major metro hubs like Delhi and Mumbai. Without these crucial connections, which provide a feed of business and transit passengers, smaller point-to-point routes struggle to attract sustainable traffic. This lack of a cohesive 'hub-and-spoke' model leaves many regional operations isolated and economically vulnerable.
