What's Happening?
The U.S. Army's recently released document, 'How the Army Fights' (HTAF), intended to guide the Army's preparation for war, is facing criticism for lacking a clear theory of victory grounded in the current strategic context. The document, published in October
2026, draws inspiration from the AirLand Battle concept but fails to align with the 2025 National Security Strategy's focus on deterrence by denial in the Pacific's first island chain. Critics, including Huba Wass de Czege, lead author of AirLand Battle, argue that HTAF, like its predecessor 'multidomain operations' (MDO), does not clearly define the military problem or articulate a coherent theory of victory against specific adversaries like China. The document's reliance on a 'central idea' with four operational elements—convergence, strike, close battle, and endurance—is seen as vague and potentially contradictory, offering ambiguous guidance for how the Army should fight in diverse scenarios.
Why It's Important?
The lack of a clear and context-specific theory of victory in the U.S. Army's guiding doctrine has significant implications for national security and military effectiveness. Without a precise understanding of how to fight and win against specific threats, the Army risks misallocating resources, developing inappropriate force structures, and failing to adequately prepare for future conflicts. This ambiguity could undermine deterrence, as potential adversaries may not perceive a credible threat. The document's focus on offensive operations, even in contexts requiring defensive strategies, could leave the Army unprepared for scenarios like amphibious defense or urban warfare. Furthermore, the use of vague language and overlapping concepts within HTAF can hinder effective communication and understanding among military personnel, allies, and adversaries, potentially leading to confusion and conflicting actions during critical moments.
What's Next?
The ongoing debate surrounding 'How the Army Fights' suggests a need for a more robust and context-specific doctrine. The criticism may stimulate further discussion and revision within the Army, potentially leading to a clearer articulation of its theory of victory, particularly concerning the 'pacing threat' of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The Army could learn from examples like the Marine Corps' adoption of expeditionary basing operations, which are rooted in a specific strategic context. Without a clear hypothesis for how it will fight, the Army may struggle to innovate and adapt to the complexities of modern warfare. The current strategic environment, with Russia engaged in Ukraine and other potential adversaries, underscores the urgency for the U.S. Army to define its operational approach to ensure readiness and maintain its deterrent capabilities.
Beyond the Headlines
The critique of 'How the Army Fights' extends beyond mere doctrinal adjustments; it touches upon fundamental questions of military philosophy and strategic thinking. The document's perceived failure to ground its concepts in specific political and military problems reflects a broader trend of viewing war in generic, technological terms rather than as a political instrument. This approach risks prioritizing the 'how' of using technology over the 'why' of military engagement, potentially leading to misaligned strategies and unintended consequences. The emphasis on 'convergence' and 'strike' without clear trade-offs or consideration for decentralized operations could also create vulnerabilities against agile adversaries. Ultimately, this debate highlights the critical need for military doctrine to be deeply informed by geopolitical realities and a clear understanding of an adversary's objectives and capabilities, rather than relying on abstract concepts or internal process management.
