What's Happening?
A recent discussion in the Small Wars Journal, following articles by Brigadier General Russell Howard and Chad Machiela, questions the effectiveness of a 'whole-of-government' approach to irregular warfare within the American constitutional system. The
core argument is that while shared language and understanding are important, the fundamental structure of the U.S. government, with its separation of powers, statutory agency mandates, and routine political leadership changes, inherently prevents the sustained, centralized coordination required for such an approach. Past attempts, like President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) and similar directives from subsequent administrations including Bush, Obama, and President Trump, have shown temporary success but ultimately failed to create lasting structural changes, often expiring with changes in political leadership. The author suggests that the American system is not designed to produce a single, coordinated entity for long-term irregular warfare campaigns, unlike centralized party-states such as China.
Why It's Important?
This analysis is important because it challenges a prevailing assumption in U.S. defense doctrine regarding irregular warfare. If the 'whole-of-government' approach is fundamentally incompatible with the American constitutional framework, then continued efforts to force such a structure may be misdirected and inefficient. This could lead to wasted resources and a failure to effectively counter adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea in long-term irregular warfare scenarios. The piece suggests that the U.S. government's design, intended to prevent concentrated power, inadvertently hinders sustained interagency unity of effort. This impacts how the U.S. can respond to complex global challenges that require integrated diplomatic, economic, and military strategies, potentially leaving the nation vulnerable in prolonged 'gray-zone' conflicts where adversaries operate with greater centralized control.
What's Next?
The article suggests that instead of pursuing a perpetually coordinated 'whole-of-government' irregular warfare model, the U.S. should consider a more flexible, problem-specific approach. This would involve investing in the capacity to rapidly establish and disband ad-hoc, Task Force 714-style constructs with clear objectives, fusion authorities, and single accountable leaders. These constructs would be dissolved once specific problems are solved, rather than institutionalized into standing programs that lose cohesion over time. Furthermore, the U.S. should re-evaluate leadership roles, potentially allowing the State Department to lead more often in efforts where diplomatic and economic aspects are primary, rather than defaulting to military-led constructs. This shift would require an honest recognition that many factors shaping irregular warfare contests occur within domestic agencies like the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, which rarely consider themselves part of an 'irregular war' effort.
Beyond the Headlines
The deeper implication of this argument lies in the tension between the U.S. constitutional design and the demands of modern irregular warfare. The system's inherent checks and balances, while crucial for democratic governance, create bureaucratic friction and prevent the kind of seamless, long-term coordination that some adversaries can achieve. This raises ethical and strategic questions about whether the U.S. should attempt to adapt its fundamental governmental structure to meet these new threats, or if it should embrace its inherent strengths—such as adaptability and problem-specific innovation—to develop alternative, more sustainable strategies. The discussion also highlights the cultural dimension within U.S. agencies, where different institutions reward different measures of success, making true shared understanding and objective alignment a significant challenge beyond mere linguistic clarity. This suggests a need for a cultural shift in interagency cooperation, fostering trust and empathy built through shared risk and proximity, rather than relying solely on top-down directives.
