What's Happening?
Since January 29, 2025, two distinct security architectures have coexisted in the Sahel region: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), now with twelve members, and the Confederation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which includes
Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, with its Unified Force based in Niamey. This situation creates two separate chains of command operating within the same geographical area, where armed groups like JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel Province continue to pose a significant threat. Dr. Bakary Sambe, Director of the Timbuktu Institute, highlights that these armed groups exploit the gaps between the two security entities, focusing on the vulnerabilities rather than the headquarters in Abuja or Niamey. The 45th meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Staff in Dakar, from November 16 to 18, 2026, is addressing this complex security landscape, with discussions centered on interoperability, counter-terrorism brigade follow-up, collective security, and local crisis prevention. The core question for military leaders is whether they will collaborate or face separate defeats against the common adversary.
Why It's Important?
The coexistence of two security architectures, ECOWAS and AES, in the Sahel region creates a fragmented response to persistent and escalating threats from armed groups. This division is critical because it allows terrorist organizations to exploit operational gaps, potentially leading to increased instability and violence across the region. The lack of unified command and coordination between ECOWAS and AES forces could undermine counter-terrorism efforts, making it harder to track and neutralize armed groups that operate across borders. For the U.S. and its allies, this fragmentation complicates regional security partnerships and counter-terrorism strategies, as it requires navigating multiple, sometimes conflicting, alliances. The instability in the Sahel also has broader implications, including potential refugee crises, disruption of trade routes, and increased opportunities for other external actors, such as Russia, to expand their influence by offering security assistance to individual states. The effectiveness of any future security initiatives will heavily depend on the ability of these two blocs to establish functional cooperation, despite their political differences.
What's Next?
The ongoing 45th meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Staff in Dakar is expected to produce technical recommendations for political leaders regarding security cooperation. Dr. Bakary Sambe advocates for a differentiated, functional cooperation model, suggesting a joint AES–ECOWAS committee of general staffs, facilitated by the African Union as a neutral mediator. This committee would focus on intelligence sharing, border management, resource allocation, and doctrine. The goal is to move beyond mere coexistence towards coordination, recognizing that military cooperation can progress faster than diplomatic resolutions. Key outcomes anticipated from the Dakar meeting include a detailed roadmap for the counter-terrorism brigade, explicit proposals for coordination with the AES, such as direct communication lines between general staffs, liaison officers, and common early warning systems. The long-term vision includes establishing a limited cross-border pursuit right. The success of these efforts will be measured by concrete indicators, such as a reduction in attacks in coastal countries, fewer corridor disruptions, and prompt investigations into abuses, aiming to prevent the creation of duplicate forces that could inadvertently benefit armed groups.
Beyond the Headlines
The fragmentation of security efforts in the Sahel, with ECOWAS and AES operating in parallel, highlights a deeper challenge in regional governance and international security cooperation. The emphasis on 'commanding separately, coordinating together' reflects a pragmatic approach to managing geopolitical rivalries while addressing a common existential threat. This situation underscores the evolving nature of security partnerships, where traditional multilateral frameworks are being supplemented or challenged by more localized and often politically driven alliances. The involvement of external powers, such as Russia, further complicates the landscape, as each partner prioritizes threats differently, potentially leading to a 'terrain of competition' among allies. The call for self-financing collective security initiatives also points to a desire for greater regional autonomy and reduced dependence on external funding, which often comes with conditionalities. Ultimately, the success or failure of this dual security architecture will not only determine the future stability of the Sahel but also offer a case study in how regions adapt to complex security challenges in a multipolar world, balancing sovereignty with the imperative of collective action against non-state actors.













